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LETHAL DISCRIMINATION 2:




"It is important to recall what motivated Members of this Court at
the genesis of our modern capital punishment case law. Furman v.
Georgia was decided in an atmosphere suffused with concern
about race bias in the administration of the death penalty-partic-
ularly in Southern States."'
-Graham v. Collins, Thomas, J., concurring
INTRODUCTION
This article addresses the persistent and pernicious problem of racial
discrimination in the administration of capital punishment, a fact that un-
dermines the credibility of not only the death penalty, but the criminal
justice system generally by compromising the Fourteenth Amendment's
promises of due process and of equal protection under the law and the
Eighth Amendment's guarantee against the infliction of cruel and unu-
sual punishment.2 The enforcement of these important constitutional val-
ues depends on aggressive and sensitive commitment to identifying and
Judge George Howard, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, William H. Bowen
School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; Founding Editor, The Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process; copyright, 2009, by the author. I also want to
acknowledge the excellent work and support provided by Molly K. Sullivan, Assis-
tant Federal Defender, Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, in editing this
article.
1. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. This article builds on the analysis of the disposition of the claim of ineffective assis-
tance by the state and federal courts in post-conviction process of the Texas capital
prosecution involving the author's client, Gary L. Sterling, and the case of Georgia
capital defendant Curtis Osborne discussed in Lethal Discrimination, which is also
published in this issue of the Harvard Journal on Racial & Ethnic Justice. Both cases
raise the specter of racial prejudice influencing the imposition of death sentences for
these African-American defendants, ultimately resulting in their executions. The
reader should note that this article, which focuses on judicial remedies designed to
protect defendants from racial discrimination in capital cases, incorporates the cri-
tique and, often, passages of Lethal Discrimination in order that it can be read and
understood independently. When appropriate, footnotes serve to direct the reader
to corresponding material in the first installment. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Lethal
Discrimination, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUSTICE 69 (2010).
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correcting the racially discriminatory imposition of capital sentences, re-
quiring meaningful review of claims implicating racial discrimination.
This article includes a series of proposals designed to address the short-
comings of current remedies available to address claims of constitutional
violations, including claims of improper influences of racial and ethnic
discrimination in the capital sentencing process. The proposed reforms
require action by the United States Supreme Court to empower and de-
mand state and federal habeas courts to provide the relief from discrimi-
nation that has so often been eloquently discussed in the Court's
decisions.
I. THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF RACIAL DIsCRIMINATION IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
To effectively address the pernicious influence of racism in the admin-
istration of the death penalty, it is necessary to first recognize that this
problem persists and undermines the credibility of capital punishment as
a criminal sanction. Clearly, abolition of capital punishment represents
the most effective means of removing the threat that death sentences will
be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously on the basis of the accused's race
or ethnic background, but abolition remains an infrequent response to
the continuing problems associated with reliance on death as a punish-
ment alternative.3 Short of abolition, meaningful reform of the criminal
justice system, generally, might offer tremendous gains in producing
a fairer capital punishment system. Perhaps the best prospect for elimi-
nating the impact of racism in the administration of the death penalty
lies in more aggressive enforcement of procedural rights designed
to protect the rights of capital defendants. This means ensuring
high quality capital representation4 and including provision of adequate
3. However, both New Jersey and New Mexico have ended reliance on capital punish-
ment within the recent past. See Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/
nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html; see Associated Press, Death Penalty Is Repealed in New
Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A16. In Connecticut, legislation to repeal the
death penalty was vetoed by the governor in 2009. See Christopher Keating, Rell
Vetoes Bill to Abolish Capital Punishment, HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2009, at A3.
The Kansas legislature has also taken up the issue of repeal of the state's death
penalty. See David Klepper, Kansas Senate Takes Up Repeal of Death Penalty, KAN.
CITY STAR, Jan. 29, 2010, available at http://www.kansascity.com/115/story/1716
864.html.
4. Regrettably, litigation focusing on the effectiveness of capital counsel remains one
of the most common sources of review of state death sentences in the federal courts.
See e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510
(2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (addressing issues relating to capital
counsel's performance in the sentencing phase of capital trials). See also Florida v.
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (considering question of trial counsel's strategic decision-
making in conceding issues relating to guilt of defendant in support of sentencing
approach focusing on mitigation); Smith v. Spisak, 130 S.Ct. 676, 685 (2010) (noting
that counsel's strategy in closing argument of characterizing mentally impaired de-
fendant as "sick," "twisted," and "demented" and discussing defendant's admira-
tion for Hitler did not support finding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance
where the record does not support conclusion that a more reasonable argument
would have, within reasonable probability, led to a different result).
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sources for investigation and other support for capital trial and appellate
counsel.5
Nevertheless, even reform designed to improve capital defense may
well prove insufficient in the long run to address many endemic
problems that result from political conflict, competition in the allocation
of resources, and the general difficulties in ensuring support within the
system. Increased resources for capital defense and enhanced procedural
protections afforded capital defendants--such as proposed in this arti-
cle-will not necessarily overcome the historical problems caused by ra-
cial discrimination in American life. Significant progress will also require
changing our approach to dealing with claims of racial discrimination in
the capital sentencing process. It means rethinking the degree of defer-
ence accorded explanations offered by trial counsel for defective strategic
decisions and deficiencies in performance, as well as reversing the almost
zealous deference afforded state court decision-making that serves to in-
sulate constitutional infractions from federal habeas review.6
5. The predomination of capital cases in federal litigation may reflect, at least in part,
federal law providing for appointment of counsel to represent state court defend-
ants in federal habeas actions, 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), and further specifying that
appointed counsel must be qualified for capital representation, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3599(b)-(d). The federal statute recognizes a right to counsel for state death-sen-
tenced inmates independent of the Constitutional guarantee to effective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
As part of a statutory package for expediting capital litigation, states are also re-
quired to provide similar access to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings in
capital proceedings to qualify for expedited federal review of death sentences, pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2006).
Yet, good representation, particularly in rural counties, is often lacking. The repre-
sentation afforded in Sterling v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), criti-
qued elsewhere in this issue, suggests the difficult problems capital defendants
encounter, particularly when the prosecution has cross-racial characteristics and the
capital defendant claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial. See J.
Thomas Sullivan, Lethal Discrimination, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUSTICE, at 72 n.
10 (2010) (noting that Sterling raised thirty-one different claims of ineffective assis-
tance in his federal habeas petition, but the United States District Court denied re-
lief on all claims, Sterling v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 21488632, *35 (N.D. Tex. April 23,
2003)).
In Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), another capital
case in which the death penalty was imposed in Navarro County, Texas-the
county of Sterling's capital trial-trial counsel failed to properly impeach the evi-
dence of the defendant's purported jailhouse confession to another inmate. The
prosecution there relied heavily on this evidence, but evidence of this type is gener-
ally discounted in the law because of the self-serving interests of a witness admit-
tedly interested in obtaining leniency for assisting the State. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction and sentence of death. Id. at 359. For a
compelling perspective on the Willingham case, see David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did
Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009) http://www.new
yorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa-factgrann.
6. For instance, consider the dissenting opinion of the late Judge Richard S. Arnold in
Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 471 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
Judge Arnold, joined by Judges Bye and Melloy, criticized the circuit court's defer-
ence to state court decision-making based on his conclusion that the state court
never actually considered the admissibility of evidence he found improperly ex-
116 E HARVARD JRNL ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUSTICE E VOL. 26, 2010
The disposition of ineffective assistance allegations in Osborne v. Terry7
illustrates the troubling power of the deference principle to frustrate con-
sideration of a claim of racial discrimination in capital representation.
Osborne argued that counsel failed to advise him of an offer made by the
prosecutor of a life sentence in return for his plea of guilty. Trial counsel
claimed that he advised his client that the state offered a life sentence in
return for his plea of guilty, not an unreasonable response to this type of
claim. Whose version is accepted depends on the relative credibility of
the defendant and counsel, and state and federal courts accepted coun-
sel's explanation as credible and reasonable in rejecting Osborne's initial
claim of ineffectiveness.8
Osborne also produced evidence in his state court post-conviction
proceeding that his attorney had referred to him as a "little nigger" in
conversations with another client and argued that counsel's representa-
tion was compromised by animus toward his own client.9 Neither the
state courts nor the Eleventh Circuit ever determined whether the allega-
tion of counsel's racial bias was credible.10 Instead, the post-conviction
courts refused to address the claim on the merits because Osborne had
not asserted it in his first state post-conviction proceeding, as required by
state law and thus, procedurally defaulted the claim that his lawyer's ra-
cial animus compromised the representation.
The "deference preference" that now characterizes federal habeas
court determinations is apparent in the treatment of the allegations that
defense counsel in Osborne exhibited racist attitudes toward Osborne.
The circuit court was concerned that the evidence supporting Osborne's
cluded from the capital sentencing hearing. The evidence related to the accused's
character was written by his younger brother who was on active duty in Iraq and
not available to testify on his brother's behalf at trial. Judge Arnold found that the
state court judge had never ruled on the letter's authenticity for purposes of admis-
sion and that the letter was particularly valuable as mitigation evidence in affording
insight into the accused's character, a fact he noted had been repeatedly commented
upon generally by the state trial judge. Id. at 473-75. Vernon Brown, an African
American, was executed on May 18, 2005. See Death Penalty Information Center,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/vemon-brown (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
7. Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2006), reh'g denied, 219 F. App'x 975 (11th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 841 (2007). The Death Penalty Information Center
reports that Georgia inmate Curtis Osborne was executed on June 4, 2008. See Death
Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/curtis-osborne (last
visited Feb. 18, 2010). Evidence supported allegations that his own attorney was
racist, repeatedly referring to Osborne as "the little nigger." Osborne, 466 F.3d at
1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit did not follow the
practice of disguising the offensive language used with asterisks or ellipses, as did
the Fifth Circuit in Sterling v. Dretke, 100 F. App'x 239, 242 (5th Cir. 2004).
8. Osborne, 466 F.3d at 1316.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1318. The Eleventh Circuit explained the district court's deference to the state
court's fact-finding on this point:
The district court also found that the affidavit is not sufficient to rebut the State
court's factual finding based on Mostiler's clear testimony that he told Osborne
about the plea offer, that Osborne rejected the offer, and that Osborne never
wavered from that position. Accordingly, the district court denied Osborne re-
lief on these claims.
Id.
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claim, including the affidavit from trial counsel's other client, was not de-
veloped until after his first petitions in state and federal court had been
denied, suggesting that the claim based on the affidavit had been proce-
durally defaulted." The state court initially credited counsel's explana-
tion that he had conveyed the plea offer to Osborne over Osborne's claims
to the contrary. It then held that this determination was res judicata and
binding on the revised, successor claim based on the witness's affidavit
attesting to counsel's hostility toward Osborne.12 Subsequently, in re-
jecting Osborne's claims in federal habeas, the district court deferred to
the state court's disposition on the ground of procedural default,3 mean-
ing that neither the state, nor federal post-conviction courts ever consid-
ered Osborne's claim that counsel's representation was compromised by
counsel's alleged racial animus.14 While the circuit court acknowledged
the claim of racism, it concluded that Osborne still failed to show that
counsel's attitude actually affected his representation: "Even if the affida-
vit correctly recounts Mostiler's statements to Huey, it does not establish
that Mostiler failed to convey the plea offer to Osborne. Moreover, Os-
borne presents no other evidence to support his claim that Mostiler's al-
leged racial animosity affected his representation."15
Conceding the usual policy of deference to the state court's procedural
default finding, the unresolved question remains: was this deference rea-
sonable without a determination of whether the defense attorney did, in
fact, demonstrate the racial animosity toward his client, Osborne, which
was supported by the testimony of another, arguably disinterested, wit-
ness? Further, if the credible evidence showed that counsel had used the
racial slur attributed to him in referring to Osborne, wouldn't that fact
suggest that counsel's claim that he explained the prosecution's plea offer
of a life sentence might not be credible at all? The general answer is quite
simply that deference to state disposition of federal claims has become a
way of life in habeas corpus. 6 The Eleventh Circuit essentially ignored
the significance of the claim of racial animus on the part of Osborne's
counsel by deferring to the procedural default of this claim by the Geor-
gia state courts.
Similarly, in 2005 the Fifth Circuit rejected the habeas claim brought
by Texas death row inmate Gary Sterling that his trial counsel had ren-
dered ineffective assistance in failing to question prospective jurors about
their attitudes toward race,'7 a line of inquiry expressly authorized by the
11. Id. at 1317.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1316-18.
14. Id. at 1318.
15. Id.
16. The Court requires deference to application of state procedural default rules based
on counsel's failure to preserve error for federal review. See, e.g., Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) (counsel failed to timely file capital defen-
dant's appeal from denial of post-conviction relief in state courts, resulting in proce-
dural bar to review).
17. Sterling v. Dretke, 100 F. App'x 239, 242-43 (5th Cir. 2004); Sterling v. State, 830
S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (affirming his direct appeal), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1035 (1992); Sterling v. Scott, No. 3:93-CV-0147- G (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 1994) (dis-
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Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Murray.18 There, the Court held
that in a capital prosecution in which the defendant and victim were of
different races, the defense is entitled to question prospective jurors about
their racial attitudes to ensure that the death sentence imposed is not
tainted by racial bias on the part of jurors.19
In Sterling, a post-trial juror interview, confirmed by testimony at the
evidentiary hearing on Sterling's application for post-conviction relief in
state court, established that one of the jurors who served on the all-white
capital jury that sentenced him to death routinely referred to African
Americans as "niggers." The juror stated in the affidavit:
There are some niggers who live a couple of blocks over. They
deal crack over there. Sometimes those niggers will start hollering
and cursing. And pretty soon they'll start shooting. One of them
stays in jail all the time. He'll be in jail a few days and then he'll
get right back out. A couple of 'em shot each other last June
Teenth over a card game. I heard about an old nigger they call XO
shooting somebody playing cards, a long time ago. He went to
TDC, but he was out by the time I moved here in 1975. People
told me not to mess with him because he would shoot you.20
Despite the clear evidence that a member of his all-white capital jury
admitted routine use of the most contemptible racial slur in referring to
missing his initial federal habeas filing for failure to exhaust state remedies), certifi-
cate of probable cause denied, 26 F.3d 29 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated
and cause remanded.
18. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
19. Id. at 35. The Turner Court observed that racial bias in a capital sentencing proceed-
ing is particularly problematic:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing
hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain
undetected. On the facts of this case, a juror who believes that blacks are vio-
lence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in decid-
ing whether petitioner's crime involved the aggravating factors specified under
Virginia law. Such a juror might also be less favorably inclined toward peti-
tioner's evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More sub-
tle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror's decision
in this case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts
of petitioner's crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty.
Id. at 35-36. Turner confirmed concerns of racial prejudice previously identified in
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973). There, the Court also recognized that risk
of racial bias infecting jury deliberations in criminal cases required opportunity for
an African-American defendant's trial counsel to inquire into potential racial bias of
prospective jurors as an essential demand of fairness required by the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 526.
20. Sterling v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 21488632, *35 (N.D. Tex. April 23, 2003) (referencing
affidavit of Juror W, subscribed and sworn to on July 12, 1993) (emphasis added). In
this article, I refer to the juror whose admissions are the primary focus of my analy-
sis, as Juror W, rather than using his name, as the lower courts did. This approach
was used by the United States Supreme Court in Uttecht, v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 5
(2007) where the Court used the designations "X, Y and Z" in discussing the re-
sponses of three prospective jurors regarding their views on the death penalty. As
in Uttecht, it is not necessary to further identify and possibly embarrass Juror W,
who is entitled to his beliefs and use of language and was honest in his in-court
testimony concerning his use of language in the post-trial affidavit submitted in
support of Sterling's application for post-conviction relief in the Texas courts.
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African Americans, not a single Justice dissented from the denial of Ster-
ling's petition for certiorari.21 Sterling's challenge directed at counsel's
failure to use the remedy afforded by Turner v. Murray for assessing po-
tential juror bias did not resonate with the Court, even though the Court
has consistently addressed questions of ineffective representation in capi-
tal cases during the past decade.22
The executions of Curtis Osborne and Gary Sterling can offer little
comfort for those who once believed the Court was moving toward a re-
jection of capital punishment or for those who continue to rely on the
federal courts to correct constitutional abuses occurring in state capital
trials. The refusal of the Court to review their cases demonstrates that
while it may review cases implicating broad public policy concerns, such
as the execution of juveniles23 or the mentally disabled,24 many defend-
ants whose death sentences are tainted by constitutional violations will
never obtain the scrutiny essential to ensuring that capital trials are free
from impermissible influences.
A. Re-assessing the impact of racial discrimination on capital sentencing
As a starting point for improving the existing process for challenging
capital sentences tainted by racial discrimination, the Court should sim-
ply recognize that the impact of discrimination on the administration of
the death penalty stands apart from other problems that serve to under-
mine fairness in the capital sentencing process.25 Generally, problems
such as inadequate training or compensation of defense counsel; inade-
quate resources for investigation and expert witnesses; reliance on sus-
21. Sterling, 544 U.S. at 1053. When Sterling petitioned for a stay of execution following
denial of his successor, or second, application for post-conviction relief, Justices Ste-
vens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented from the denial of the stay. Sterling v. Texas,
545 U.S. 1157 (2005). The stay was denied less than an hour before Sterling's execu-
tion. In the successor petition, Sterling claimed that the Texas courts had improp-
erly refused to consider newly discovered evidence, including testimony at the state
court's post-conviction hearing from the investigating officer that his testimony at
Sterling's trial nine years earlier was incorrect with regard to the time of death.
Sterling contended that the officer changed his testimony upon learning that the
investigative files established an alibi for Sterling at the time originally claimed for
the offense. At the hearing, Sterling called an un-impeached witness who provided
an alibi for at least part of the time when the lead investigator, Navarro County
Sheriff's Deputy "Bubba" Jones, testified he subsequently came to believe the crime
had occurred. The state court refused to consider the claim of newly discovered
evidence on the merits, holding that it had not been timely raised. Sterling, 100 F.
App'x at 244-45.
22. Sullivan, supra, note 2.
23. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (holding that execution of defendant under the age of eigh-
teen at the time of offense is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments)).
24. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (holding that execution of mentally retarded capital defendants
is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment)).
25. Graham v. Collins, Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (observing that the Court has had a long-standing concern that racial discrimi-
nation not infect the administration of the death penalty).
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pect types of evidence that often undermine the integrity of fact-finding,26
such as use of jailhouse informants27 or prosecution witnesses whose tes-
timony may be influenced by inducements offered by police or prosecu-
tors; 28 or unreliable eyewitness identification29 do not directly implicate
the continuing damage done to the criminal justice system by racial dis-
crimination.30 Nonetheless, these problems should be viewed with a
sharp eye toward ensuring reliability of the capital trial and sentencing
processes.
However, public perception that the penalty is administered in a man-
ner unfair to racial and ethnic minorities31 or the poor undermines the
26. See, e.g., Tibbs v. State, 337 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1976). The Tibbs court found such serious
questions of credibility in the prosecution's case rested on: eyewitness testimony so
"riddled with conflicts and so inherently incredible as to be unreliable," id. at
789-90; a jailhouse informant who testified that Tibbs had confessed, id. at 790; and
the absence of any corroborating physical evidence, id. at 791. The majority con-
cluded: "Rather than risk the very real possibility that Tibbs had nothing to do with
these crimes, we reverse his conviction and remand for new trial." Id. at 791. Be-
cause the reversal was based on the state court's assessment of the weight, rather
than legal sufficiency, of the evidence in this capital case, the United States Supreme
Court held that the reversal did not amount to an acquittal precluding retrial as a
matter of prior jeopardy. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 46-47 (1982).
27. E.g., Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), affd after new trial, 100
P.2d 1078 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). In Dodd, a death penalty case, the Oklahoma
court adopted specific rules regarding admission of the testimony of a jailhouse
informant relating a purported confession made by the accused. Id. at 784-85.
28. The potential for improper inducements made to witnesses resulting in improper
convictions was explored by a panel of the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Singleton,
which shocked the prosecution world in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), prohibit-
ing the promise or payment of anything of value to a witness with regard to their
testimony, applies to bar federal prosecutors from offering inducements to prospec-
tive witnesses in order to gain the use of their testimony. Following the expected
outrage, the circuit, en banc, restored the traditional order of things in holding that
the statute did not apply to the United States Attorney. United States v. Singleton,
165 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In its majority opinion, the circuit
court characterized the Government's position: "[T]he United States argues to al-
low section 201(c)(2) to sweep so broadly [sic] would not only be a radical departure
from the ingrained legal culture of our criminal justice system but would also result
in criminalizing historic practice and established law." Id. at 1299. The Singleton
litigation spawned considerable commentary. See, e.g., George C. Harris, Testimony
for Sale: the Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 24-27 (2000)
(discussing Singleton litigation and noting that panel opinion "[s]en[t] shock waves
through the community of federal prosecutors.").
29. See e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78-80 (2008).
30. The exception to this general observation arises in the context of misidentification in
cross-racial eyewitness identification cases. The flaws in witness recall may not be
the product of conscious racial bias, but rather, environmental or possible genetic
factors that impair accuracy in making identifications of individuals from different
racial or ethnic groups. See id. at 79, n.86.
31. In examining disparity in support for the death penalty among white and black
Americans, one suggested explanation focuses on seeming overrepresentation of
black inmates on death row in the United States. For example, Gallup Poll Associ-
ate Editor Joseph Carroll, noting that white American support for the death penalty
stands at 71%, while support among blacks surveyed in 2004 stood at 44%, suggests:
This stark difference may be the result of the ongoing debate about the overrep-
resentation of blacks on death rows across the country. The Bureau of Justice
Statistics reports that there were 3,374 prisoners on death row in 2003, of which
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very credibility of capital punishment as a legitimate instrument of the
criminal justice system. In fact, political scientists Mark Peffley and Jon
Hurwitz conclude, based on their research: "[T]here is abundant evidence
that African Americans regard the U.S. criminal justice system as inher-
ently unfair-i.e., that it discriminates against them on the streets and in
the courts. For this reason, blacks do not need any reminder of the ra-
cially-discriminatory nature of the death penalty .... "32
Probably the only factor more troubling for proponents of capital sen-
tencing lies in the incidence of exonerations based on substantially-
proven claims of actual innocence for defendants sentenced to death. The
Death Penalty Information Center currently reports that "[a]s of Novem-
ber 3, 2009 there have been 139 exonerations in 26 different States,"33 in-
volving individuals released from death row with evidence of their
innocence. Peffley and Hurwitz note that support for the death penalty
fell generally in the late 1990s, attributed in part to the increasing disclo-
sure of exonerations of death row inmates based on exculpating DNA
evidence and declining crime rates.34 In examining existing scholarship
and interpreting their own survey data, Peffley and Hurwitz conclude
that support for the death penalty among both whites and blacks tended
to drop when survey respondents were presented with the additional
consideration that flaws in the system may be resulting in the execution
of too many innocent people.35 But the drop in support was substantially
smaller among white respondents than among black respondents.36
B. Re-assessing the remedies in place to combat racial discrimination in
capital sentencing proceedings
The Osborne litigation points to one of the most troubling problems in
ensuring administration of the death penalty in a racially- and ethnically-
neutral fashion. The allegation that Osborne's own attorney referred to
him in a racist vein, supported by evidence never tested by examination
in the post-conviction process, is disheartening. What is perhaps of
greater concern is the willingness of state and federal courts to ignore the
claim-and the possible consequences for the fairness of the process by
which Osborne's death sentence was imposed-based on the limitations
1,418 were black and 1,878 were white. Blacks represent 42% of the inmates on
death row, but only 12% of the nation's population.
Joseph Carroll, Who Supports the Death Penalty?, Death Penalty Information Center
(November 16, 2004), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did
= 1266&scid.
32. Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Persuasion and Resistance: Race and the Death Penalty in
America, 51 AM. J. POLITICAL SCIENCE 996, 1001 (Oct. 2007) (citations omitted).
33. See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, http:/ /www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty#inn-st (last visited Feb. 18,
2010).
34. Peffley & Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 996-97, (examining historical support for capital
punishment and citing Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna De Boef, & Amber E. Boyd-
stun, An Evolutionary Factor Analysis Approach to the Study of Issue Definition
(2004) (unpublished manuscript presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association)).
35. Id. at 1001, 1002, Table 1.
36. Id.
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imposed by state and federal procedural rules precluding consideration
of his claim that counsel's racial attitudes compromised the effectiveness
of his representation.
The two principal remedies for addressing racial discrimination in the
capital sentencing process are focused on the selection of the capital trial
jury, which generally performs the function of fact-finder on the question
of guilt or innocence of the capital defendant and then typically makes
findings that determine whether a sentence of death should be imposed
in the event of conviction on the capital charge.37 First, the Court's deci-
sion in Batson v. Kentucky38 addresses the problem of exclusion of minority
jurors from the trial process through the prosecution's exercise of per-
emptory challenges. Because of the important role played by juries in
capital sentencing determinations, Batson addresses the problem of racial
influences in those proceedings by restricting prosecutors from excluding
minority jurors from the process.
Second, the Court recognized a remedy for inclusion of potentially
racially-biased jurors in capital trials involving minority defendants and
white victims in Turner v. Murray.39 There, the Court held that defense
counsel is entitled to question prospective jurors on issues of racial atti-
tudes in order to ascertain whether evidence of bias might warrant exclu-
sion of a prospective juror, or alternatively, afford the defense a basis for
the exercise of its peremptory challenges to remove a suspect juror.40
37. The Court's application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) has arguably mandated jury sentencing in capital cases.
However, the question remains open, as some state courts have rejected this conclu-
sion. See Stephens v. State, 982 So.2d 1110, 1134-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (rejecting
application of Apprendi to the jury advisory verdict rendered in an Alabama capital
prosecution in which the trial court actually imposed punishment). The litigation in
Stephens proceeds from the premise that Ring v. Arizona does not mandate jury sen-
tencing in capital cases and that states retain the option of delegating discretion
regarding imposition of capital sentences to trial judges. In Ring, the majority con-
cluded: "Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude, are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
increase in their maximum punishment." 536 U.S. at 589.
38. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
39. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
40. Id. at 36-37. Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted the
need for defense counsel to have all necessary information to properly exercise per-
emptory challenges. Id. at 40-41. In disagreeing with the majority's limitation of
the right to voir dire on racial prejudice to capital cases, he explained:
My sense is that the Court has confused the consequences of an unfair trial with
the risk that a jury is acting on the basis of prejudice. In other words, I suspect
that what is really animating the Court's judgment is the sense of outrage it
rightly experiences at the prospect of a man being sentenced to death on the
basis of the color of his skin. Perhaps the Court is slightly less troubled by the
prospect of a racially motivated conviction unaccompanied by the death pen-
alty, and I suppose that if, for some unimaginable reason, I had to choose be-
tween the two cases, and could only rectify one, I would remedy the case
where death had been imposed. But there is no need to choose between the
two cases. To state what seems to me obvious, the constitutional right impli-
cated is the right to be judged by an impartial jury, regardless of the sentence,
and the constitutional focus thus belongs on whether there is a likelihood of
bias, and not on what flows from that bias.
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Neither remedy proves particularly effective in combating race-dis-
crimination in the selection of capital juries. Batson has proved erratic in
terms of effectiveness because the Court has simply failed to force rigor-
ous enforcement of the remedy in practice. Turner has proved problem-
atic because voir dire practice is often inadequate to ferret out racial
animus in prospective jurors predisposed to deny bias.
1. Flaws in enforcement of Batson
Batson addresses the problem of discrimination by prosecutors using
peremptory challenges to exclude minority jurors by authorizing the de-
fense to challenge the basis for the State's strikes and by requiring the
prosecution to offer a race-neutral explanation for the strike once the de-
fendant makes the prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. How-
ever, the post-Batson litigation history has demonstrated precisely how
difficult enforcement of the remedy for discriminatory use of perempto-
ries has been in practice. The Court itself undermined Batson in Purkett v.
Elem,41 where, in a per curiam order, it watered down the remedy and
expectations for constitutionally-sensitive exercise of discretion by trial
judges. It did so by essentially accepting on faith the prosecutor's expla-
nation that he struck jurors based on hair length and facial hair, race-neu-
tral explanations for his decision to exclude the minority jurors.42 The
Court did not address the problem that hair length and facial hair might
reflect cultural values that would prompt the exercise of the strike based
upon a factor simply masking racial bias and discriminatory intent.43 The
Court's decision to permit trial courts to rely on any race-neutral explana-
tion for strikes of minority jurors in Purkett v. Elem, regardless of how
superficial, simply invites prosecutors to fabricate race-neutral grounds
for their discriminatory exclusion of jurors so long as presiding trial
judges are unwilling to question the integrity of the prosecutors or the
proffered rationales.
Id. at 43-44. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, also dissented in part from
the majority's holding limiting the right to voir dire on racial attitudes to capital
cases. Id. at 45 (citing his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Ross v. Massachu-
setts, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973)).
41. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
42. Id. at 766. The Court related in its per curiam order:
The prosecutor explained his strikes:
"I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long
curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared
to me to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging
down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. Also, he had a mustache and a
goatee type beard. And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and
goatee type beard. Those are the only two people on the jury ... with the facial
hair .... And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut,
both of them. And the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me."
Id.
43. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented in Purkett, arguing: "Today, with-
out argument, the Court replaces the Batson standard with the surprising announce-
ment that any neutral explanation, no matter how 'implausible or fantastic,' even if
it is 'silly or superstitious,' is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination.
Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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Miller-El v. Dretke44 provides an example of the difficulties involved in
ensuring that trial courts make good on Batson's guarantee of racially-
neutral jury selection. In Miller, in order for the Court to grant the defen-
dant habeas relief, it had to reject the findings of Texas courts on which
lower federal courts had relied when they ruled that an apparent system-
atic use of peremptory challenges to exclude minority jurors from the
capital trial of a minority defendant did not demonstrate racially discrim-
inatory action by a Dallas County, Texas prosecutor.45 The history of the
Miller-El litigation-including the Court's initial remand to the Fifth Cir-
cuit46-demonstrates precisely how weak the Batson enforcement mecha-
nism has often been in practice.47
Similarly, the extended litigation in Snyder v. Louisiana48 demonstrates
the same sort of unreasoned deference to trial court fact-finding or expla-
nations offered by prosecutors in the jury-selection process during direct
appeals in state courts. In Snyder, the Court eventually had to overrule
the determination by Louisiana state courts that a prosecutor's use of a
peremptory challenge to exclude a minority juror from service in a capital
trial was constitutionally acceptable after its original remand for reconsid-
eration had resulted in the state supreme court maintaining its deferential
position. The state trial court had offered no subjective ground for ac-
cepting the prosecutor's purportedly race-neutral explanation for the
strike, affording the Snyder majority the option to essentially render judg-
ment in reversing the state court.49
The prosecutor's peremptory strike in Snyder excluded a minority ju-
ror who expressed concern that his participation as a capital juror would
interfere with completion of the student teaching requirement to earn his
education degree.50 But subsequent information showed that the ex-
pected duration of the trial would not actually present the juror with any
44. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
45. Id. at 234.
46. Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2000), denying certificate of appealability,
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 534 U.S. 1122 (2002), granting cert., 537 U.S. 322 (2003), rev'g
and remanding to Fifth Circuit for appeal on the merits; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 361 F.3d
849 (5th Cir. 2004), denying relief on the merits.
47. But Miller-El does not represent the last instance of state and lower federal court
hesitance in rejecting prosecutors' explanations for their peremptory strikes aimed
at removing minority jurors from Dallas County capital juries. More recently, in
Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit granted federal
habeas relief, ordering a new trial for a Texas inmate who had spent thirty years on
death row based on his claim that prosecutors had discriminatorily removed minor-
ity jurors through exercise of their peremptory challenges during the selection of his
capital trial jury. Id. at 365 ("This case has spent three decades winding its way
through the state and federal court systems. Today, we add to that lengthy history
by concluding that Reed is entitled to habeas corpus relief for his Batson claim.").
The Texas court affirmed Reed's conviction and death sentence in Reed v. State, No.
69,292 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 1995).
48. 522 U.S. 472 (2008); Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2006), granting cert, State v.
Snyder, 750 So.2d 832 (La. 1999), and opinion after remand for additional fact-finding,
874 So.2d 739 (La. 2004) (vacating the judgment and remanding for reconsideration
in light of the Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)).
49. 522 U.S. at 484-86.
50. Id. at 479-80.
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problem in completing the required student teaching experience.51 A
white juror, who was not struck and was subject to considerable rehabili-
tation by the prosecutor, advised the court that he was a contractor with
two houses under construction that required completion before buyers
could move in and, additionally, disclosed a family problem: "[M]y wife
just had a hysterectomy, so I'm running the kids back and forth to school,
and we're not originally from here, so I have no family in the area, so
between the two things, it's kind of bad timing for me."52 The prosecutor
accepted this juror. The Snyder Court looked to the disparity in examina-
tion of white and black jurors and the prosecutor's decision to retain a
white juror whose situation was almost identical to that of the excluded
black venireperson, rejecting the explanation that the black juror ap-
peared "nervous" as a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of its per-
emptory challenge.53
Miller-El and Snyder demonstrate both the difficulty in enforcing the
guarantee of Batson and the ultimate power resting with the Supreme
Court to force state and federal courts to honor the promise of capital
juries selected without racially-discriminatory prosecutorial tactics de-
signed to frustrate Batson. Batson itself was a result of the failures of the
Court's pronouncement in Strauder v. West Virginia54 and the Court's rem-
edy recognized in Swain v. Alabama.55
2. The flawed remedy provided by Turner v. Murray
The obvious inadequacies in the remedy afforded by Turner v. Murray,
designed to permit counsel to discern racially discriminatory attitudes
held by prospective capital jurors, are readily identified in the explana-
tion given by Sterling's Texas trial counsel for not questioning prospective
jurors regarding racial or ethnic bias.56 Counsel explained in the post-
conviction process that he did not inquire about racial attitudes because,
in his experience, jurors seldom responded honestly to questions seeking
to discern racially-discriminatory attitudes.57 The Fifth Circuit accepted
this rather straightforward explanation for counsel's failure to question
jurors about racial prejudice during voir dire58 as strategically reasona-
51. Id. at 480-82.
52. Id. at 484.
53. Id. at 479, 485-86.
54. In Strauder, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879), the Court held the statutory exclusion of Afri-
can Americans from jury service unconstitutional. The discriminatory exclusion of
minority jurors through exercise of peremptory challenges was similarly held un-
constitutional in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1965).
55. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
56. 117 F. App'x 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2004).
57. Id. at 332 ("While Dunn did not question any potential jurors about racial bias, he
stated this decision rested on his belief that he very seldom receives truthful
answers.").
58. Moreover, the court related the State's response argument to Sterling's ineffective-
ness claim:
W clearly indicated he could be fair to both sides. Dunn testified at the state
habeas hearing that despite any potential prejudiced views, he considered W a
"fair man" and "probably a middle-of-the-road juror for Navarro County."
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ble.59 Thus, trial counsel's failure to even attempt to use the remedy pro-
vided in Turner was found to be reasonable precisely because his
reasoning for not doing so was facially quite credible.
The problem posed by trial counsel's explanation for not questioning
Sterling's trial jurors about their attitudes on race lies in the simple fact
that it demonstrates the naivet6 of the Turner court in assuming that in-
quiry on this subject will ever ensure that jurors holding discriminatory
attitudes will be identified and excluded from service on capital juries in
cross-racial cases.60
Moreover, trial counsel's explanation for his decision not to inquire
into racial attitudes of prospective jurors included two more disturbing
points. First, he explained that he was content with accepting Juror W
because he believed that the juror was, in fact, a middle-of-the-road juror
in the county in which Sterling was tried.61 If true, his disclosure raises
the question of whether it would be possible to seat a racially-non-biased
jury in a capital trial in Navarro County, Texas. Second, he also explained
that he believed his prior relationship in representing Juror W would ac-
tually benefit Sterling.62 His perception reflects a superficially reasonable,
but likely naive and potentially dangerous, assessment that his prior rep-
resentation of the juror would essentially serve to counteract or overcome
the juror's obviously long and deeply held views on African Americans.
Miller-El and Snyder reflect the Court's ongoing concern with the possi-
bility of racial stereotyping by prosecutors in using peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude minority jurors from service on capital cases, while
Sterling arises in the context of reliable evidence that a juror harboring
racially-discriminatory attitudes actually sat in a case in which the death
penalty was imposed. The common thread of concern for addressing ra-
cial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty was unfortu-
nately not sufficient to convince the Court that its subsequent decision in
Miller-El necessarily warranted reconsideration63 of its denial of certiorari
in Sterling.64 Miller-El obtained a new trial on the showing that prosecu-
tors discriminated in their use of peremptory challenges to deny jury ser-
vice to two African-American venirepersons without any showing of
actual or likely actual prejudice in the conduct of jurors who did sit in the
case. Sterling, on the other hand, suffered execution despite demonstrat-
Dunn also reasoned that because of his prior attorney-client relationship with
W, W's presence on the jury would enure to Sterling's benefit.
Id. at 332.
59. Id.
60. Sterling's trial lawyers did rely on the remedy afforded under Batson, however, ar-
guing unsuccessfully at trial and on direct appeal that the State exercised its per-
emptory challenges to exclude minority venirepersons from service on his jury.
Sterling v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114, 118-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
61. Sterling, 117 F. App'x at 332.
62. Id. at 332-33.
63. The Court issued its opinion in Miller-El on June 13, 2005. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
64. Sterling moved for rehearing on the basis of Miller-El after denial of certiorari on
May 23, 2009. Sterling v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 1053 (2005), denying petition for cert. Re-
hearing was denied on August 1, 2005. Sterling v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 115 (2005), peti-
tion for reh'g denied.
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ing a strong, prima facie case of actual racial bias on the part of a juror
who did sit on his case.65
II. A PROPOSAL FOR REPAIRING THE REMEDIES FOR RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
The problem of race-based discrimination infecting the capital punish-
ment system is not likely to be resolved through general repudiation of
the death penalty. To the extent that existing remedies for dealing with
colorable claims of racial bias tainting capital sentences can ever be effec-
tive in practice, serious thought should be directed toward repairing
those remedies to enhance the authority of reviewing courts to afford re-
lief for constitutionally-compromised death sentences.
A. Remedying the flaws in the available solutions for racial discrimination
through application of the strict scrutiny standard for review of state
action
The general standard for review of racial discrimination in state ac-
tion-strict scrutiny-establishes a constitutional norm for considerations
of racially-discriminatory treatment. 66 One approach to recognizing a
more aggressive protection from discriminatory application of the death
penalty would incorporate the use of strict scrutiny as a standard of re-
view for claims of race-based discrimination arising in the context of indi-
vidual criminal prosecutions. Existing tools for enforcement often fail to
address claims of discrimination that rest on the circumstances of an indi-
vidual capital case, frustrating the goal of a fair administration of the
penalty.
Nor should the usual deferential standard for federal habeas review
dilute the constitutional commitment to a fair and non-discriminatory use
of the death penalty in the criminal process. In assessing the claim of
racial prejudice in the context of Sterling's death sentence, trial counsel's
decision not to question the racial attitudes of jurors was afforded defer-
ence in the disposition of Sterling's allegation of ineffective assistance. As
his case demonstrates, deference to trial counsel's explanations or trial
65. A claim directly challenging the death sentence imposed as a result of racial animus
would almost certainly have failed in light of evidence supporting the penalty in
Sterling. Juror W denied being racist, as the Fifth Circuit noted. Sterling, 117 F.
App'x at 332. The state trial court's conclusion that Juror W did not act out of racism
would have been a factual finding binding on the federal habeas courts. See,
e.g.,Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (holding state court's finding regarding
qualification of prospective juror to serve on capital jury presumed correct in fed-
eral habeas). For more on the predisposition of the state trial judge initially as-
signed to hear Sterling's application for state post-conviction relief, see Sullivan,
supra note 2. Moreover, the then-recent amendments to the federal habeas statute,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996),
suggested that deference to state court law and fact-finding would complicate litiga-
tion of any federal habeas claim, while an error in the unreasonable application of
existing federal constitutional law by a state trial court would afford a better chance
for relief.
66. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[AIll racial classi-
fications [imposed by government] must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.").
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court findings imposes a difficult and almost impossible burden upon
capital, and non-capital, defendants seeking to prove that their convic-
tions and sentences are tainted by racist attitudes of jurors.
In order to increase the effectiveness of procedural protections af-
forded by Turner and Batson, the Court should refine its approach to ap-
pellate and federal habeas review of constitutional claims where issues of
race are inherent in the prosecution and imposition of a death sentence.
Cases involving minority defendants, particularly involving cross-racial
capital offenses, should be reviewed with the level of heightened scrutiny
applied to state action adversely impacting cognizable ethnic groups.
This level of scrutiny is applied in civil rights actions, as evident in the
Court's decision in Johnson v. California67 addressing racial segregation in
correctional institution assignments.68
The Court has, of course, differentiated its analytical approach to
claims asserted under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Traditionally, the former source of protec-
tion has focused on the fairness of the proceeding in which an individ-
ual's liberty or property has been compromised by the action of
government, while the latter focuses on official action impacting the
rights of recognized groups of persons.
Alternative approaches have been applied to the analysis of state ac-
tion taken with respect to creation and enforcement of the criminal law,
sometimes with more than one being considered within a single decision.
For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,69 members of the Court agreed that
the state habitual criminal sterilization statute was unconstitutional, but
considered separately arguments that it violated both the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Doug-
las, writing for the majority, concluded that the statute violated equal
protection.70 Chief Justice Stone concurred, arguing that the statute so in-
vaded personal privacy as to violate due process, while rejecting the ma-
jority's equal protection analysis.71 And, Justice Jackson concluded that
the statute violated both due process and equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Similarly, in Jackson v. Indiana,73 the Court
struck down state law authorizing indefinite commitment of defendants
67. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
68. Id. at 506.
69. 316 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1942).
70. Id. at 538. Although the case was decided on Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion grounds, petitioner also asserted due process violations based on the procedure
under which a sterilization order was obtained. The majority declined to consider
other theories for relief urged by the petitioner in light of its disposition of the case
on equal protection grounds. Id. at 538.
71. Id. at 543-45 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
72. Id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson would later lead the prosecution
of Nazi leaders at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. Those proceedings included
allegations of forced sterilization policy implemented by the Third Reich, a fact that
makes his position in Skinner seem particularly revealing. See Jack W. Robbins, A
Prosecutor's Remembrance of Nuremberg, http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/
SpeechesNuremberg__Robbins/ (last visited Feb 10, 2010).
73. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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incompetent to proceed to trial both in terms of equal protection74 and
due process75 claims, noting the close relationship in the application of the
two approaches.76
In considering issues relating to racial discrimination in the operation
of the criminal law, including classifications implicit in statutes criminal-
izing behavior, the Court has appreciated the interplay between equal
protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment and the use of the
state police power: "It would violate the Equal Protection Clause for a
State to base enforcement of its criminal laws on 'an unjustifiable stan-
dard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.' 77
What is also true is that when the issue of racial discrimination in the
operation of the criminal law is in issue, the line between due process and
equal protection is blurred as the Court has consistently held that the
Fourteenth Amendment affords protection from race-tainted convictions
and sentences. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court summarized this rather
historically-consistent position, observing:
Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal
justice process, we have engaged in "unceasing efforts" to eradi-
cate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system. . . This
Court has repeatedly stated that prosecutorial discretion cannot be
exercised on the basis of race. Nor can a prosecutor exercise per-
emptory challenges on the basis of race. More generally, this
Court has condemned state efforts to exclude blacks from grand
and petit juries. Other protections apply to the trial and jury de-
liberation process. Widespread bias in the community can make a
change of venue constitutionally required. The Constitution pro-
hibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments. If the circum-
stances of a particular case indicate a significant likelihood that
racial bias may influence a jury, the Constitution requires ques-
tioning as to such bias. Finally, in a capital sentencing hearing, a
defendant convicted of an interracial murder is entitled to such
questioning without regard to the circumstances of the particular
case.
78
Having declared the Court's commitment to eliminating the pernicious
influence of race in the criminal process, however, Justice Powell and the
McCleskey majority proceeded to reject McCleskey's claim that race influ-
ences capital punishment decisions and his supporting statistical evi-
dence. Instead, the majority excused the possibility that capital
sentencing decisions were influenced by factors such as the race of the
74. Id. at 723-30.
75. Id. at 731-39.
76. Id. at 731 (noting its due process analysis: "For reasons closely related to those discussed
in Part II above, we also hold that Indiana's indefinite commitment of a criminal
defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process") (emphasis added).
77. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 n.8 (1987) (citing Oyler v. Bowles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962)) (rejecting attack on use of habitual punishment statute based on
equal protection claim).
78. Id. at 309 n.30 (internal citations omitted).
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accused or the victim, noting: "At most, the Baldus study indicates a dis-
crepancy that appears to correlate with race. Apparent disparities in sen-
tencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system. The
discrepancy indicated by the Baldus study is 'a far cry from the major
systemic defects identified in Furman .... "'79
Thus, when presented with evidence supporting the claimed infringe-
ment on the petitioner's rights, the majority rejected the constitutional sig-
nificance of that evidence because it did not directly implicate racial
prejudice in the imposition of McCleskey's own death sentence, while
holding the same evidence failed to demonstrate "major systemic de-
fects." The majority thus engaged in something of a constitutional
"Catch 22"8o in which an individual inmate cannot demonstrate prejudice
implicating his own death sentence despite evidence of a general consti-
tutional defect, without indicating what level of proof could ever be suffi-
cient to show "major systemic defects."
It is difficult to explain why equal protection ensured by the Four-
teenth Amendment should be subject to a more rigorous standard for
constitutional reviews' than state action impacting the guarantee of fair
application of the death penalty articulated by the Court as implicit in the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in numerous capital punishment de-
cisions.82 Of course, in the capital sentencing context, the Court has
viewed the overlap in the two amendments to flow from the guarantee of
due process in the Fourteenth, while the application of strict scrutiny as a
standard for review has traditionally been invoked in considering state
action arguably violating the Amendment's equal protection guarantee.
But nothing actually would preclude the Court from applying its concern
for formal classifications that may discriminate based on race or ethnicity
to the imposition of capital punishment where the evidence or underlying
facts raise the possibility of state action tainted by impermissible discrimi-
nation. Consider the rationale for applying strict scrutiny Justice
O'Connor recounts in Johnson v. California:
The reasons for strict scrutiny are familiar. Racial classifications
raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious pur-
79. Id. at 312-13 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 455 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)).
80. Catch-22, a term coined by Joseph Heller in his novel Catch-22, "describe[s] a situa-
tion of deadlock, composed of two mutually exclusive sets of conditions." THE OX-
FORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE (Dinah Birch, ed.) available at http://
www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview =Main&entry= t113.e1388
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
81. In Johnson, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had consistently applied strict
scrutiny in reviewing classifications urged to violate the Equal Protection Clause in
a number of contexts: "We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for
so-called 'benign' racial classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions
policies, race-based preferences in government contracts, and race-based districting
intended to improve minority representation." Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499,
505 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
82. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314, 359 n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 345-46 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589 (1978); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005)
(noting intersection of Eighth Amendment protections and Fourteenth Amendment
due process considerations governing capital sentencing process).
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pose. Thus, we have admonished time and again that, "[a]bsent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining ... what classifi-
cations are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferi-
ority or simple racial politics." We therefore apply strict scrutiny
to all racial classifications to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race
by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."83
If the Court is truly interested in preventing the imposition of capital
sentences based upon impermissible racially-discriminatory attitudes of
various actors in the criminal justice system-including prosecutors, de-
fense counsel, jurors, and perhaps even judges-then there is no reason
not to view capital sentencing decisions with the same degree of scrutiny
as classification systems used by state actors.
It makes little sense to act more vigorously to protect the rights of
minority inmates classified for completion of prison sentences than the
rights of capital inmates subject to execution for their offenses. Little
sense, that is, unless one claims that the more heinous nature of the
crimes committed by capital defendants justifies less protection from ra-
cial discrimination.84 The history of the Court's capital punishment juris-
prudence counters any suggestion that the quality of due process should
vary based on the nature of the allegation, just as the Court is loath to
suggest that due process can be constitutionally rationalized based on the
race or ethnicity of the accused.85
Application of a strict scrutiny standard to address challenges to capi-
tal sentences in which evidence or factual contexts suggest legitimate con-
cerns about racial prejudice influencing the capital prosecution and
sentencing process would provide far greater protection against constitu-
tionally-tainted death sentences than that afforded by the scheme of re-
view now in place. The high degrees of deference afforded to trial
counsel based on questionable representation of capital defendants86 and
83. 543 U.S. at 505-06 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989))
(internal citations omitted).
84. For example, in Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 170 (2003), the Supreme Court commented
on the particularly difficult problems posed for defense counsel in capital cases:
[Tihe gravity of the potential sentence in a capital trial and the proceeding's
two-phase structure vitally affect counsel's strategic calculus. Attorneys repre-
senting capital defendants face daunting challenges in developing trial strate-
gies, not least because the defendant's guilt is often clear. Prosecutors are more
likely to seek the death penalty, and to refuse to accept a plea to a life sentence,
when the evidence is overwhelming and the crime heinous.
Id. at 190-91.
85. In fact, the Court has ruled that even detainees at Guantanamo Naval Base desig-
nated as "enemy combatants" are afforded the right of habeas corpus to challenge
their confinement. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct 2229, 2247-73 (2008).
86. Consider the deference afforded to trial counsel's explanation in responding to an
allegation of defective representation underlying an effective assistance of counsel
claim as a matter of "strategy" in McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505-06 n.20
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The claim was that lead counsel was asleep during the
afternoon sessions of the defendant's capital trial. The court held that he could not
demonstrate prejudice as a result of counsel's "naps." With regard to co-counsel's
failure to awaken the older lawyer, the Court of Criminal Appeals opined: "We
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to state courts in rejecting federal constitutional claims on procedura87 or
factual grounds88 insulates the overwhelming majority of state court im-
posed capital sentences from meaningful federal habeas review.
Reliance on the strict scrutiny standard of review should not be lim-
ited to death sentences because distortion of the criminal justice process
due to racial discrimination cannot be justified in any case. But, capital
sentences represent a starting point for aggressive intervention that
would likely lead to broader use of strict scrutiny when warranted by
evidence developed in the course of any prosecution. Review of capital
sentences is a logical starting point for a shift in constitutional policy,
however, in light of the disparity in support for the death penalty among
black and white Americans.
The Florida Supreme Court's aggressive approach in Robinson v. State
suggests an appropriate response to interjection of racial animus in a cap-
ital prosecutionS9 and should serve as a model for appellate and post-
conviction courts dealing with racial taint in capital prosecutions.90 There,
the court held:
might also view Melamed's decision to allow Benn to sleep as a strategic move on
his part. At the new trial hearing, Melamed stated that he believed that the jury
might have sympathy for appellant because of Benn's 'naps."' Id. at 505-06, n.20.
After the Fifth Circuit held that sleeping capital counsel constructively denied the
accused the right to effective assistance in Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 345 (5th
Cir. 2001), the Court of Criminal Appeals reconsidered McFarland's claim. It re-
jected the claim on the ground that because co-counsel had actively participated in
the trial while counsel slept, McFarland could not show prejudice necessary to sup-
port his ineffectiveness argument. Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 753 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). It did so while noting that neither McFarland, nor lead counsel,
wanted co-counsel's assistance in representing him in the case, id. at 750-51, and
while noting the affidavit of one juror who sat in the case: "In an affidavit submit-
ted in the habeas proceeding, one juror stated that Mr. Benn's sleeping 'was so bla-
tant and disgusting that it was the subject of conversation within the jury panel a
couple of times."' Id. at 751 n.8. See also, Echols v. State, 127 S.W.3d 486, 560-61
(Ark. 2003). In that case, the state court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance at a
capital trial based on trial counsel's failure to object to testimony by a psychologist
regarding information contained in defendant's mental health records due to lack of
prejudice from trial counsel's strategic decision not to object. The testimony showed
that the defendant did not object when he was compared with Charles Manson and
Ted Bundy during a hospital admission. Trial counsel claimed that he did not object
to introduction of this testimony during the punishment phase of trial because he
wanted jurors to understand the extent of his client's "mental health problems." Id.
at 561. Echols was sentenced to death.
87. E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) (resulting in procedural bar
to review on certiorari or in federal habeas corpus due to counsel's failure to timely
file capital defendant's appeal from denial of post-conviction relief in state courts).
88. In Osborne v. Terry, for example, a state post-conviction court deferred to claims
made by defendant's trial counsel that he had conveyed a life sentence plea bargain
offer by the prosecutor to his client. 466 F.3d 1289, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006). Federal
courts subsequently deferred to this state court determination. Id. at 1317.
89. 520 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1988).
90. Id. at 6. As the court explained, and as shown by the following transcript of testi-
mony included in its published opinion, the prosecutor suggested during his exami-
nation of a defense medical expert that the defendant's crime may have been
racially motivated:
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The situation presented here, involving a black man who is
charged with kidnapping, raping, and murdering a white woman,
is fertile soil for the seeds of racial prejudice. We find the risk that
racial prejudice may have influenced the sentencing decision un-
acceptable in light of the trial court's failure to give a cautionary
instruction. Our courts consistently have held that the trial judge
should not only sustain an objection to such improper conduct but
also should reprimand the offending prosecuting officer in order
to impress upon the jury the gross impropriety of being influ-
enced by improper argument or testimony.91
This type of aggressive approach to appellate review not only serves to
counter the possibility that a capital sentence has been imposed with the
cross-race nature of the crime interjected as a factor, but also directs trial
courts to act affirmatively to address improper interjection of race in the
capital trial, rather than relying on their discretion to deny mistrial mo-
tions. The Robinson court concluded: "We agree with appellant that the
prosecutor's examination of this witness was a deliberate attempt to insin-
uate that appellant had a habit of preying on white women and thus con-
stituted an impermissible appeal to bias and prejudice."92
Of course, aggressive action by state judges in capital cases not only
reinforces their fidelity to enforcement of federal constitutional values by
preventing or redressing improper appeals to racial animus, but also
serves to avoid the need for federal courts to intervene in state capital
cases.
B. A proposal for judicially-imposed reform
To ensure its commitment to the elimination of racial prejudice in the
administration of the death penalty, the Supreme Court should carefully
MR. ALEXANDER (prosecutor): Would you say, Doctor, that it's a fair state-
ment that the Defendant, Mr. Robinson, is prejudiced toward white people,
specifically, women?
DOCTOR KROP: I don't know if he's prejudiced against them in the way we
typically think of prejudice in terms of feeling like whites are worse than blacks
or blacks are worse than whites. I think he has probably a lot of hostility built
up. I don't know enough about his history in terms of whether there were
racial prejudices which occurred substantially in his own background which
would back that up, but I think he just has a lot of difficulty with women in
general and I really can't say whether it's necessarily a racial hostility.
MR. ALEXANDER: In regard to one of the answers you gave Mr. Pearl, you
noted the Defendant had told you about several victims in the past in regard to
sexual encounters. Are you familiar with the gender and the race of those par-
ticular victims?
DOCTOR KROP: I believe that Mr. Pearl indicated that they were white.
MR. ALEXANDER: Do you know if they were male or female?
DOCTOR KROP: I probably don't know for sure. I presume they were white
females.
MR. ALEXANDER: And you know the victim in this case also was a white
female, do you not?
DOCTOR KROP: Yes, I do.
Id. at 15-16.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id.
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reformulate its approach to review of these claims in both the direct ap-
peal and post-conviction processes. The Court should provide greater
protection against the possibility that a death sentence will be imposed
due, if only in part, to racial animus on the part of jurors, as well as prose-
cutors, state court judges, or, as in the case of Curtis Osborne, on the part
of their own attorneys.
1. Identify racial influences in imposition of death penalty as matters of
structural error
The Court's characterization of certain constitutional errors as "struc-
tural" is especially important in affording protection when subjective
considerations of motive and effect are particularly difficult to assess. In
this context, the Court's treatment of jury selection issues in Batson93 and
Witherspoon v. Illinois94 is particularly instructive. The distinction between
errors that are deemed "structural" and thus not subject to harmlessness
analysis in determining whether the defendant suffered prejudice, and
"trial error" was explained by the Court in Arizona v. Fulminante.95
"Trial error" is error occurring during the course of trial, typically in
the admission or exclusion of evidence or in the presentation of the case
to the jury.96 These errors may be evaluated in terms of prejudice to the
defendant by reference to the totality of evidence offered in support of the
prosecution's case.97 For instance, the Fulminante Court concluded that
even the admission of a coerced confession, previously held presump-
tively prejudicial in Payne v. Arkansas,98 could be subjected to harmless-
ness analysis.99
The most informative examples of structural constitutional error stem
from the jury selection process. The discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors from service on the basis of
race,100 ethnicity,o1 or gender02 results in a structural error because a re-
viewing court has no basis from which to determine whether the exclu-
sion of a juror for improper reasons might have affected the course of the
trial, including the sentencing decision. Thus, error in the use of even a
single peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror based upon
93. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
94. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
95. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
96. Id. at 307-08.
97. Id. at 308 (noting that error may be assessed "quantitatively"). For example, in
Landreth v. State, 960 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Ark. 1998), the court held that the capital
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was violated by the prosecu-
tor's improper reference to his decision not to testify at trial, but nevertheless held
that the error was harmless in light of the totality of the evidence adduced in sup-
port of the conviction at trial.
98. 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
99. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
100. E.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that claim of discriminatory use of
peremptories to exclude black jurors may be made by white defendant in criminal
trial).
101. Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135,
1142 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding use of peremptory to exclude Latino juror).
102. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B, 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994).
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race, ethnicity, or gender requires reversal of conviction, even when a
criminal defendant otherwise could not demonstrate any prejudice result-
ing directly from the exclusion of the juror.103
The Court's other significant concern with exclusion of prospective ju-
rors has focused on the problem of death qualification of jurors in capital
cases. In Witherspoon, the Court ruled that prospective jurors expressing
opposition or reservations concerning capital punishment could only be
excluded as unqualified for service if they said they would vote contrary
to the evidence in either the guilt or punishment phases of a capital trial
in order to avoid imposing a death sentence.10" The test for disqualifica-
tion was further refined in Adams v. Texas to preclude exclusion where, as
under Texas law, the prospective juror could not affirm under oath that
his concerns about the death penalty would not affect his deliberations.105
Because it is impossible for a reviewing court to assess whether the
improper exclusion of a Witherspoon-eligible juror would have affected
the outcome of a capital trial, the error is treated as structural. Even
though a reviewing court might well have been able to conclude that on
the basis of overwhelming evidence, no rational juror could have acquit-
ted, the history of death penalty litigation shows that the decision to im-
pose life, rather than death, cannot be accurately predicted.106
103. For example, in Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1997), the
Ninth Circuit granted relief based on improper exclusion of one minority juror even
though four other African Americans were empanelled.
104. 391 U.S. at 517-19.
105. 448 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1980) (holding that jurors opposed to capital punishment but
capable of responding fairly and directly to punishment interrogatories used to de-
termine punishment cannot be disqualified under Witherspoon).
106. The inability to rationally assess jury behavior with respect to capital sentencing has
been noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in declining to consider appel-
late attacks on death sentences for evidentiary insufficiency with respect to implicit
rejection of mitigation evidence. Eldridge v. State, 940 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996). The Eldridge court explained:
[T]he jury determines whether any evidence has mitigating effect and, if so,
how much. We have said that these two decisions are normative and therefore
are not reviewable by this Court. So long as the jury has all potentially relevant
evidence before it, we continue to defer to the jury and believe its unfettered
discretion under Article 37.071 § 2(e) is constitutionally valid. As we have con-
sistently done in the past, we decline to review the jury's decision on the miti-
gation special issue.
Id. at 652 (citations omitted). The court then conceded: "Appellant is therefore cor-
rect to say that appellate review of a capital jury's Article 37.071 § 2(e) decision is
impossible." Id.
Similarly, in rejecting a challenge to an affirmative finding regarding the capital
defendant's propensity to commit acts of criminal violence in the future, the "future
dangerousness" issue, the court reaffirmed in Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 896,
n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005): "Appellant also argues that the evidence of future dan-
gerousness is factually insufficient. However, we do not conduct factual sufficiency
reviews of the future dangerousness special issue." Id. In a similar vein, the inabil-
ity to rationally assess capital sentencing decisions by juries has been criticized by
Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In his view, as distilled here, the unlimited discretion im-
posed upon state capital sentencing process by the Court's decisions results in an
arbitrary or capricious administration of the death penalty because the virtually un-
limited options for consideration of mitigating circumstances permits juries to im-
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Consequently, the Court has vacated death sentences imposed by ju-
ries from which even a single Witherspoon-qualified juror was 07 excluded.
Further, in Gray v. Mississippi,108 the Court rejected the State's harmless
error argument based on the theory that prosecutors would have used
otherwise unexhausted peremptories against Witherspoon-excluded jurors
had they not been excused by the trial court. In rejecting this approach,
the Court reconfirmed its original, but arguably flawed, commitment in
Witherspoon to inclusion of diverse views on the death penalty on capital
juries.109
The Batson and Witherspoon lines of cases not only illustrate the princi-
ple of structural constitutional error, but also apply directly to the issue
raised in Sterling: the participation of a racially-biased juror in the capital
sentencing process. Even assuming that the evidence would have sup-
ported the statutorily-required unanimous affirmative responses to the
special issues necessary for imposition of a death sentence under Texas
law,110 the presence of a tainted juror would have compromised the jury's
ability to reliably consider the special issues and, thus, the capital sen-
tence imposed in Sterling's case.
In order to make existing remedies for discrimination in the capital
sentencing process more effective, and to deter future discrimination, the
structural error approach used for jury selection issues should be ex-
tended to other claims arising from racial or ethnic discrimination in the
conduct of the proceedings or on the part of decision makers or advo-
cates. Consistent with this notion, in Smith v. Winters"' the Seventh Cir-
cuit observed: "We are mindful that a prosecutorial tactic that invokes or
relies on racial prejudice, such as striking prospective jurors on racial
grounds, is reversible error without regard to the effect on the out-
come."112 Once a violation is shown, the elimination of the requirement
for proof of prejudice or even likely prejudice prevents race-based dis-
criminatory decision-making from being excused by reliance on harmless
error analysis to insulate the death sentence from attack.
2. Assign the burden of proof on the State to disprove that racial
prejudice had any role in imposition of the death penalty
While evidence of racial discrimination on the part of key actors in the
capital prosecution process, whether jurors, judges, prosecutors or de-
pose life sentences for wholly inconsistent and irrational reasons. Id. at 666-68.
Walton was overruled in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
107. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
108. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
109. In this view, the commitment was procedurally "flawed" precisely because it re-
tained the prosecutor's option of removing prospective jurors perceived as reluctant
to impose death through peremptory strikes. The commitment was substantively
"flawed" as was made explicitly clear when the Court rejected a standard by which
even conscientious opponents of capital sentencing would be eligible for service in
order to have capital juries properly reflect divergent community sentiment. Lock-
hart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-177 (1986).
110. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 81-87, Sections IB1-3.
111. 337 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2003).
112. Id. at 938.
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fense counsel, should trigger consideration of possible structural error re-
quiring invalidation of a death sentence, the issue of whether race or
ethnic bias has infected the process will necessarily require a factual
determination.
Even when facts or circumstances suggest evidence of racial bias, test-
ing allegations of bias may result in a good faith rejection of the claim.
Moreover, racial bias or discriminatory attitudes do not necessarily war-
rant relief in all cases because the reality of continuing racism in Ameri-
can life is often a factor in criminal proceedings. For example, the
motivation for the commission of a crime may itself be linked to racial
animus, yet evidence of this factor does not itself suggest any constitu-
tional infirmity.113 Or, the capital defendant may deliberately inject racist
attitudes into the proceedings or acquiesce in a strategy deliberately em-
ployed by defense counsel that will infuse the capital trial with elements
of racial discrimination that might compromise the fairness of the pro-
ceedings.114 In such cases, relief from a conviction or sentence, including
a death sentence, imposed by jurors not shown to have been acting with
any racial animus is not tainted under this approach.
What does implicate constitutional values is evidence of racial animus
on the part of state actors or actors acting on behalf of the State, such as
jurors or a single juror, as in Sterling's trial. And, while Juror W's conclu-
sions might well have been precisely the same had he not harbored feel-
113. Interjection of race and racial prejudice would, of course, be particularly relevant in
some capital prosecutions. For example, in King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000), the state court reviewed a capital conviction and death sentence in a
case in which the victim, an African American named James Byrd, was seen late at
night riding in the back of a pickup truck with three white men in the truck cab.
His dismembered body was found the following day. The underlying felony sup-
porting the capital offense was kidnapping. Id. at 558. In rejecting the insufficiency
challenge to the evidence supporting the kidnapping, the court of criminal appeals
noted:
The State presented evidence of appellant's racial animosity, particularly to-
wards African-Americans. Several witnesses testified about how appellant re-
fused to go to the home of an African-American and would leave a party if an
African-American arrived. In prison, appellant was known as the "exalted cy-
clops" of the Confederate Knights of America ("CKA"), a white supremacist
gang. Among the tattoos covering appellant's body were a woodpecker in a Ku
Klux Klansman's uniform making an obscene gesture; a "patch" incorporating
"KKK," a swastika, and "Aryan Pride"; and a black man with a noose around
his neck hanging from a tree. Appellant had on occasion displayed these tat-
toos to people and had been heard to remark, "See my little nigger hanging
from a tree."
Id. at 559-60. In King, racial discrimination was, itself, a factor relevant to proof of
the offense, not a collateral concern undermining the integrity of the prosecution or
fact-finding.
114. For example, the Court rejected an ineffective assistance challenge in Smith v. Spisak,
130 S.Ct. 676, (2010), where counsel deliberately injected and emphasized the capital
defendant's racist views, including admiration for Hitler, in an effort to demonstrate
the significant extent of his mental impairment as a strategy in arguing that jurors
should exercise greater humanity in not imposing the death penalty. Id. at 684-87.
The Court reversed the circuit court's order granting relief, agreeing with the Ohio
Supreme Court's conclusion that Spisak was not able to demonstrate that a more
acceptable approach by counsel would have probably resulted in any more
favorable outcome. Id. at 687-88.
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ings of disdain for blacks, that fact undermines the integrity of the
sentence imposed as a result of the findings of the capital jury on which
he served.
In order to provide maximum protection against racial animus influ-
encing a capital trial or sentencing proceeding, the burden of disproving
existence of racial or ethnic discrimination compromising the integrity of
a death sentence should be assigned to the State. When the Chapmanl5
harmless error test applies to assess likely prejudice from constitutional
trial error, the burden of proving that the error did not contribute to the
conviction or sentence is placed upon the prosecution. 116 With respect to
structural error, however, the question for the trial court would not be
prejudice, but simply whether or not the claimed error is, in fact, sup-
ported by the evidence.
The framework created by the Batson Court provides a workable ap-
proach for resolving, initially, claims of racial discrimination compromis-
ing the integrity of the capital trial or sentencing hearing. It requires that
the defendant make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor used per-
emptories in a discriminatory fashion,117 usually by objecting to the strike
of a minority juror, although in some cases, exclusion of a majority juror
can trigger the process.118 The prosecutor must then respond with a race-
neutral explanation for the strike; a general denial of racially-discrimina-
tory intent is insufficient to meet this requirement.119 Then, the trial court
is required to assess the strike in the context of the prosecutor's explana-
115. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
116. Id. at 24.
117. The Batson challenge, however, is not limited to the prosecution's use of strikes since
the Supreme Court has held that even the defense may violate the rights of prospec-
tive jurors to serve by exclusion through peremptories on the basis of race or ethnic-
ity. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1992) (reasoning that because the
protection afforded from the use of peremptories in a discriminatory fashion is de-
signed to protect the rights of prospective jurors as citizens, neither the State nor
defense may use peremptory strikes discriminatorily based on race or ethnicity).
118. For instance, in a capital trial of a black defendant accused of murdering a black
victim, a prosecutor might attempt to influence the course of the eventual sentenc-
ing proceeding by using strikes against white jurors perceived as less likely to im-
pose death for the murder of a black victim. Although the motivation might be to
further a race-neutral goal of ensuring that the penalty is actually used equitably
with respect to the race or ethnicity of the victim, the method would still violate the
defendant's right to have a jury selected without reliance on racial or ethnic stereo-
types. It would also implicate state action in denying the prospective juror the right
to serve on a jury without regard to his or her race or ethnicity. Thus, in Childs v.
State, 237 S.W.3d 116 (Ark. App. 2006), the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction where the State objected to the defendant's use of all eight peremptory
challenges to exclude white jurors. Id. at 117. The trial court, rejecting defense
counsel's explanations for each strike as failing to meet the "race-neutral" test for
the strike, refused to strike several of the jurors and the defendant objected to viola-
tion of his right to exercise his peremptory challenges. Id. at 118-19. On appeal, the
court found that the strikes were supported by acceptable explanations, but never-
theless, upheld the conviction, finding that the issue had been improperly framed
on appeal. Id. at 120.
119. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (reaffirming rule that a denial of
discriminatory intent, even made in good faith, is insufficient to rebut a prima facie
case of discriminatory exclusion).
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tion and determine whether, in fact, the explanation simply constitutes a
pretext for the impermissible use of the strike.120
Similarly, in considering a claim of racial discrimination tainting a
capital sentence, the defendant-regardless of the stage of the proceed-
ings--would simply be required to make the prima facie showing of dis-
crimination on the part of a juror or jurors; the prosecutor1 21 or law
enforcement officers who are, by definition, members of the prosecution
team;122 the trial court; or the defense counsel.123 Once that preliminary
showing is made, the prosecution would then be required to rebut the
claim of racial animus, or possibly demonstrate that the discriminatory
act was wholly unrelated to the conduct of the criminal trial, such as a
situation in which a stop and arrest was the product of racial profiling,
but where the prosecution would not necessarily be barred despite that
circumstance.
This approach of assigning the burden to the prosecution to disprove
racial discrimination in the capital prosecution once the defense has
presented evidence supporting its claim is not unprecedented, as the Sny-
der Court recognized. There, Justice Alito, writing for the majority, ob-
served: "In other circumstances, we have held that, once it is shown that
a discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in an action
taken by a state actor, the burden shifts to the party defending the action
to show that this factor was not determinative.124
Justice Alito relied on Hunter v. Underwood125 for this proposition, a
case in which the Court, through Justice Rehnquist, held that where an
Alabama statute disenfranchising individuals convicted of misdemeanors
was prompted by the racially-discriminatory purpose of excluding black
citizens from the voting rolls, the basis for exclusion violated constitu-
tional protections.126
However, in addressing racial discrimination tainting a death sen-
tence, the reliance on the Batson framework as a means of assessing the
merits of the claim would only apply to state action. This approach could
never reach the problem of a life sentence imposed by jurors who effec-
tively nullified evidence supporting a capital sentence based on racial dis-
crimination because once the life sentence has been imposed, there would
be an intensely controversial problem in attempting to impose a remedy
120. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
121. E.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979) (noting Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibits selective prosecution of defendant based on race).
122. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); Lewis v. State, 691 S.W.2d 864, 865
(Ark. 1985).
123. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 7-15.
124. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1212 (2008). The Court noted that the Hunter v.
Underwood standard had not explicitly been applied in a Batson case and did not
find it necessary to do so on the facts of the case. Id. In the Batson framework, the
prosecution need only offer a race-neutral explanation in response to the objection,
leaving the decision as to whether the plaintiff has sustained the challenge to the
trial judge.
125. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
126. Id. at 224-25, 233.
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that disturbed the jury's sentence, a death sentence not subject to altera-
tion in some cases due to double jeopardy protection.127
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Smith v. Winters128 illustrates part of
the problem in assessing claims that racial animus constitutes "error,"
even structural error, requiring that a death sentence be voided. There,
the claimed structural error involved the prosecutor's alleged display of a
swastika before the jury. The court rejected this action as amounting to
structural error, even after affirming that "a prosecutorial tactic that in-
vokes or relies on racial prejudice, such as striking prospective jurors on
racial grounds, is reversible error without regard to the effect on the
outcome. "129
Instead, the Smith court declined to apply structural error analysis in
considering the claim, while also expressing doubt as to its factual credi-
bility. Judge Posner distinguished racial prejudice amounting to struc-
tural error from error still subject to harmlessness analysis:
But if the alleged displaying of swastikas to jurors be deemed a
racist tactic, on the ground that Nazis are notoriously racist, still
the appeal to racial prejudice was too attenuated to preclude a
determination of harmless error under the normal standard ...
applicable to state trial errors challenged by means of federal
habeas corpus. It is not as if the prosecutor had been wearing a
white hood and singing "The Old Rugged Cross." A prejudiced
remark or its symbolic equivalent is not a per se ground for rever-
sal. . . .Even if as we doubt the swastika incident actually oc-
curred, still it was harmless so far as the outcome of the trial was
concerned.130
The court's approach is consistent with the usual differentiation between
structural and trial error standards of review. The claim arose from the
purported actions of the prosecutor during the presentation of the case to
the jury and thus, applying the usual approach to review of trial error
claims, could be assessed in light of the totality of the record. But the
court's conclusion also raises an important question regarding judicial re-
view of claims of racial discrimination in prosecution of criminal actions
particularly relevant to capital prosecutions.
127. In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), the Court held that where a capital
sentencing jury imposes a life sentence based on findings returned in a trial-like
context, based on application of a burden of proof, the sentence serves to bar impo-
sition of death in a subsequent trial. Id. at 444-45. The protection does not apply to
a death sentence imposed in a proceeding not requiring the prosecution to carry a
burden of proof in order to obtain a death sentence. Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S.
147, 155-56 (1986). But see Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 (1984) (holding
double jeopardy did bar death sentence where original life sentence imposed by
judge based on finding of prosecution's failure to prove aggravating circumstance
necessary for imposition of death penalty). Nor does a life sentence imposed as a
result of a jury's failure to reach a unanimous verdict in the capital sentencing pro-
ceeding bar imposition of a death sentence at a subsequent trial. Sattazahn v. Penn-
sylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003).
128. 337 F.3d 935.
129. Id. at 938.
130. Id. (citations omitted).
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The decision in Smith v. Winters differentiates between those instances
in which race-based discrimination constitutes structural errors and those
in which the claimed violation is either deemed so remote, or perhaps,
corrected, that no rational jurist would find the proceedings or the results
tainted. If, in fact, the prosecution is able to carry its burden of either
refuting the allegation that racial animus infected the proceedings at all or
that the incident giving rise to the claim was, in fact, so minimal that it
could not have tainted the proceedings, then the reviewing court-
whether at trial, on appeal, or in the post-conviction process--could prop-
erly rule against the capital defendant. This would, of course, simply re-
flect the third step in the Batson determination process. Otherwise, any
claim of racial discrimination would necessarily result in relief, penaliz-
ing prosecutors, judges and jurors acting in good faith in the capital trial
and, ultimately, severely-perhaps, fatally-undermining the credibility
of the penalty precisely because race could be used by minority defend-
ants to defeat application of the death penalty regardless of the genuine-
ness of the complaint. Thus, a mere allegation of racial taint could be
discredited, preventing misuse of the strict liability test to afford relief in
cases in which race played no impermissible part in the imposition of a
death sentence.
3. Review claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing de novo
at all stages of the post-trial process
Finally, the Supreme Court should act to restore the authority of fed-
eral courts to review claims of racial discrimination in the capital sentenc-
ing process, which has been compromised over the past decades by the
Court's general shift toward support for the values of comity and federal-
ism. The Court has elevated concerns for the relationships between state
and federal courts over the traditional focus of federal review of state
court disposition of claims of federal constitutional violations by state
courts. Both state court decision-making and state law now serve to block
federal review of state judgments rejecting claimed constitutional viola-
tions. In order to address the persistent problem of racism that com-
promises the integrity of criminal court judgments and sentences-
particularly involving the administration of capital punishment-the
Court should re-define its posture on federal review when serious and
factually-supported claims of racial animus tainting state court prosecu-
tions have been rejected by state courts.
The Seventh Circuit observed in Smith v. Winters131 that racial animus
on the part of state actors constitutes "structural error" in all aspects of
the criminal prosecution and is not simply limited to racial discrimination
in the selection of the grand jury132 where utilized to trigger criminal pro-
131. 337 F.3d at 938 (referring to discriminatory use of peremptories as an example of
discriminatory action triggering application of structural error rule).
132. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261-64 (1986) (rejecting application of harmless
error analysis to discriminatory composition of grand jury which returned an in-
dictment resulting in defendant's prosecution and noting unbroken line of authority
holding such events a error structural not corrected by subsequent conviction of the
accused).
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ceedings and the petit jury.133 Application of structural error analysis ef-
fectively reduces both the load of state courts in the direct appeal and
state post-conviction processes and the lower federal courts in the federal
habeas process.
In order to afford necessary protection to both capital defendants and
the credibility of capital punishment, the Court must act to restore au-
thority to federal courts to review claims of racism tainting capital sen-
tencing and demand state court vigilance in the enforcement of applicable
federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process in
the capital process. In so doing, the Court will need to undo much of its
judicial decision-making that has promoted expedited and deferential
process at the expense of rigorous enforcement of the Constitution.
a. Implementing the "structural error" standard for characterization of
racial discrimination claims
While the constitutional requirement that such error be treated as
"structural" may seem clear, the Supreme Court should expressly hold
that structural error analysis must be applied in review of all demon-
strated claims of racial animus or discrimination on the part of state ac-
tors to assure that such claims are subject to review in state and lower
federal courts. The Court's action in this regard is essential to ensuring
that state courts properly apply this mode of analysis to claims based on
racial or ethnic discrimination.
Relief in the federal habeas process, for instance, is only available
upon a showing that the state court's determination of such a claim re-
sults in a decision contrary to existing Supreme Court precedent or a deci-
sion which is unreasonable in light of the Court's precedent. The federal
habeas statute creating the avenue for federal relief for petitioners con-
victed in state court proceedings expressly limits the authority of federal
habeas courts, providing, in pertinent part:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a per-
son in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States .... 134
Thus, where the state decision does not conflict with existing Supreme
Court precedent, the federal habeas court lacks authority to grant relief.
For instance, in Brown v. Payton, the Court held that the federal habeas
statute precluded grant of relief based on alleged infirmity in California
capital sentencing instructions where the state court decision did not re-
133. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) ("If the trial court decides that the facts
establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come
forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that peti-
tioner's conviction be reversed.").
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).
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flect incorrect or unreasonable application of United States Supreme
Court precedent.135
Moreover, federal habeas courts are not permitted to engage in exten-
sion of precedent by analogy in resolving claims of federal constitutional
error.136 Consequently, the observation by the Seventh Circuit in Smith v.
Winters, while theoretically correct, would not itself constitute the requi-
site precedent for federal habeas relief for claims based on racial discrimi-
nation in the administration of the death penalty other than those relating
to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges or other procedures in-
volved in selection of grand or petit jurors.
In order to ensure that claims of racial animus or discrimination taint-
ing capital proceedings are assessed in terms of structural error, the Court
must take the next available opportunity to expressly apply structural er-
ror analysis to such claims.
b. Limiting application of state procedural default rules as "adequate and
independent" grounds for state court decisions that reject claims of
racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
The Supreme Court has long held that where a state court determina-
tion rests on an alternative ground to federal law-an "adequate and in-
dependent" state law ground for decisiort-federal review of the state
court disposition is barred in either the certiorari137 or federal habeas pro-
cess. 138 The application of this rule as a bar to federal review of state court
decisions has proved extremely important in two contexts with particular
relevance to disposition of federal constitutional claims raised in state
criminal proceedings.
First, the application of a jurisdictional bar to the Court's own certio-
rari review of state court decisions resting on adequate and independent
state law grounds139 has facilitated the development of state constitutional
135. 544 U.S. 133, 147 (2005).
136. Under the "new rules" doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), new rules
of constitutional criminal procedure cannot be announced by lower federal courts in
the habeas corpus process. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994); Goeke
v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1995) (federal habeas courts cannot announce new
rules of existing rules of constitutional criminal procedure, following Teague, 489
U.S. at 301).
137. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-1041 (1983) ("If the state court decision
indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate,
adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the
decision."); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (explaining that Court declines
to take jurisdiction when state court determination rests on state law grounds); Fox
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) ("[Wlhere the judgment of a state
court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other nonfederal in
character, our jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal ground is independent of the fed-
eral ground and adequate to support the judgment.").
138. E.g., Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1997); Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991).
139. See Michigan, 462 U.S. at 1040 ("Respect for the independence of state courts, as well
as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this
Court's refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent state
ground.").
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law that often provides greater protection for criminal defendants in state
proceedings than that afforded by comparable federal constitutional pro-
tections.140 For example, in Arkansas v. Sullivan,141 the Court summarily
reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court, which had held that a search inci-
dent to a pretext arrest violated the federal constitution, where the Court
itself had expressly rejected this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
in Whren v. United States.142 Because the state court's ruling was "flatly
contrary" to the Court's interpretation of federal constitutional law, the
Court summarily reversed,143 explaining: "The Arkansas Supreme Court's
alternative holding, that it may interpret the United States Constitution to
provide greater protection than this Court's own federal constitutional
precedents provide, is foreclosed by Oregon v. Hass." 144 On remand, how-
ever, the state supreme court again upheld the suppression of the evi-
dence seized pursuant to the defective stop and search, this time relying
on the state constitutional protection.45
The development of state constitutional law not only expands protec-
tion for state court criminal defendants, but also may serve to inform the
Supreme Court in its own views of federal constitutional protections, as it
did in Arizona v. Gant.146 There, the Court rejected New York v. Belton147
and the "bright-line" rule it had recognized148 permitting police to search
the interior of an automobile within the occupant's reach once they had
lawfully stopped the vehicle and removed the occupant from the vehi-
140. The author, like many others, has written on the phenomenon of development of
state constitutional law over the past quarter century or so. For a brief discussion of
the development of state constitutional doctrine generally, see J. Thomas Sullivan,
Danforth, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 425, 434-37 (2008). For a
comprehensive examination of the development of state constitutional law in a sin-
gle jurisdiction that has demonstrated particularly aggressive application of state
law protections as an alternative to comparable protections afforded under the fed-
eral constitution, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Developing a State Constitutional Law Strat-
egy in New Mexico Criminal Prosecutions, 39 N.M. L. REV. 407 (2009).
141. 532 U.S. 769 (2001), rev'g State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 526 (Ark. 2000).
142. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
143. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771.
144. Id. at 772 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)).
145. State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 221-22 (Ark. 2002) (relying on Article II, Section 15
of the Arkansas Constitution). Justice Brown, who wrote the majority opinion for
the state court on remand in Sullivan, had also written the court's opinion in Jegley v.
Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002), where the Arkansas court struck down the state's
sodomy statute as violative of the state constitutional right to privacy even before
the United States Supreme Court's similar ruling on federal constitutional grounds
in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The development of Arkansas constitu-
tional law as an alternative basis for decision on claims involving limitations on the
authority of state officials led to scholarly comment, including Justice Brown's own
view of the role of the state supreme court. See Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights
through State Law: The United States Supreme Court Shows State Courts the Way, 4 J.
App. PRAC. & PROCEss 499 (2002); Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism
Takes Root in Arkansas, 58 ARK. L. REV. 883 (2006) (examining development of Arkan-
sas constitutional law).
146. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).
147. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
148. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1714 ("[W]e hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search
incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot
access the interior of the vehicle.").
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cle.149 The Gant majority noted that a number of state courts had rejected
Belton in favor of more restrictive authority for police in searching auto-
mobile interiors150 Consequently, the insulation of state law rulings pro-
tected from federal review by the "adequate and independent" state law
grounds principle not only results in creative state court decision-making,
but adds to the constitutional debate over the scope of protections prop-
erly afforded by the federal constitution.
However, the application of the jurisdictional limiting principle predi-
cated on state law determinations that are both "adequate" and "inde-
pendent" of federal constitutional precedent also serves to insulate
potentially meritorious federal constitutional claims from review in fed-
eral courts. The bar to federal review extends to state court procedural
rulings as well as substantive holdings. Thus, where the defendant fails
to present his federal constitutional claim to state courts for determina-
tion in accordance with state procedural rules,151 a refusal to consider the
claim based on the application of a procedural rule results in a default of
the claim.152
In Coleman v. Thompson153 for instance, counsel failed to file a timely
notice of appeal-by three days-from a denial of post-conviction relief.'54
The state court dismissed the appeal based on the untimely filing. The
petitioner argued that counsel's error in failing to timely file should ex-
cuse the default, but the Court held that because there is no constitutional
right to post-conviction process, there is not corollary guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.155 Conse-
quently, counsel's failure was neither excused, nor the subject of an
independent ineffective assistance claim as a matter of Sixth Amendment
protection.156
The critical problem posed by reliance on state procedural default to
bar consideration of claims by state inmates that their capital convictions
and sentences are tainted by racial discrimination is that these claims are
149. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. The Court applied the same rule in Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
150. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 n.8. The majority noted that at least eight states had rejected
the Belton court's "bright line" approach to vehicle searches and observed: "The
chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members
of this Court who have questioned that decision's clarity and its fidelity to Fourth
Amendment principles." Id. at 1716.
151. See, e.g., State v. Fudge, 206 S.W.3d 850, 861 (Ark. 2005) (alleging ineffective assis-
tance in capital counsel's "failure to include federal grounds in his motion for di-
rected verdict ... foreclosed Fudge's opportunity to present the claim in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding.").
152. E.g., Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 857-58 (2002) (rejecting argument that counsel's
failure to raise ineffective assistance claim with regard to conduct of capital sentenc-
ing proceeding in prior state post-conviction proceedings should not have been
characterized as procedural default where failure to litigate claim was result of ac-
tual conflict of interest in public defender office).
153. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
154. Id. at 727.
155. Id. at 752-53. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (holding no federal
constitutional right to state post-conviction process and, consequently, no Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction process).
156. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
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often among the most difficult to discover and prove. Yet, failure to pre-
serve and present these claims in the normal course of state direct appeal
and post-conviction process forecloses federal review when state courts
rest their decisions squarely on default rules, rather than proceeding to
consider the federal claims on the merits.
The problem of discovering and then presenting claims of racial taint
is compounded by the Court's determination that the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel does not extend to representation
in the state discretionary review process,157 the certiorari process for re-
view of state court judgments by the United States Supreme Court,158 or
state 5 9 or federal post-conviction process. 60 As a consequence, counsel's
failure to investigate or properly present a federal constitutional claim
based on racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
does not afford the capital defendant a basis for avoiding application of a
state procedural default rule to preclude federal rule under existing
precedent.161
The problem posed for a defendant whose death sentence is tainted by
racial discrimination or animus is illustrated by the disposition of Curtis
Osborne's claim. There, the source of the racial discrimination was Os-
borne's own counsel who could hardly be expected to acknowledge and
preserve such a claim on his client's behalf in state proceedings. Never-
theless, the state courts applied procedural default principles to the fail-
ure to allege the claim that counsel's racist attitudes compromised his
duty to provide effective assistance. The state courts' reliance on proce-
dural default was then taken to bind the federal habeas court, eventually
resulting in the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the claim,162 which permit-
ted Georgia's execution of Osborne to proceed.163 On the facts of Osborne,
the procedural bar imposed by Georgia did not reflect a reasonable ap-
157. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 615-17 (1974) (holding right to assistance of counsel
does not extend to discretionary review in state appellate process); O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of discretionary re-
view within state appellate systems in holding that failure to seek such review in
the state appellate process precludes a federal habeas court from later reviewing
claims of federal constitutional error which were not presented to the state supreme
court).
158. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 8 (1994) (citing Ross v. Moffitt for pro-
position that the Constitution does not afford right to counsel for discretionary pro-
ceedings, including certiorari, in challenge focusing on petitioner's right to
representation by appointed counsel for purpose of petitioning Court for certiorari
as a matter of statute, 18 U.S.C § 3006, or by circuit rule).
159. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989)
(holding no Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings, including capital proceedings).
160. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976).
161. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986) (requiring showing of constitutionally
ineffective counsel for excuse of procedural default based on counsel's perform-
ance). But see, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) (holding that de-
fective performance by counsel in state post-conviction litigation could not excuse
procedural default because there is no constitutional right to assistance of counsel in
this stage of the post-trial process).
162. Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006).
163. Supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
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preciation for the realities of litigation in which the petitioner often has
little opportunity to realistically challenge counsel's representation, par-
ticularly with regard to matters of investigation and proof necessary to
sustain a constitutional claim.
In order to ensure that capital sentences are not imposed as a result of
racial animus or discriminatory intent, the Court should refuse to con-
tinue recognizing procedural default in state proceedings as adequate
grounds for barring review of claims of racial discrimination in capital
prosecutions. Clearly, this would be a significant departure from the
Court's prior decisions, yet the determination of whether a state procedu-
ral default should serve to bar federal review is, itself, a question the
Court answers. For instance, in Henry v. Mississippi,164 the Court distin-
guished between independent state law grounds that rest on state sub-
stantive law and those that rest on procedural rules, noting that in the
former, federal review would essentially constitute intrusion in the appli-
cation and enforcement of state law, rather than exercise of federal juris-
diction to interpret or apply federal law.165 In contrast, the Court
explained with respect to review barred on state procedural grounds:
These justifications have no application where the state ground is
purely procedural. A procedural default which is held to bar chal-
lenge to a conviction in state courts, even on federal constitutional
grounds, prevents implementation of the federal right. Accord-
ingly, we have consistently held that the question of when and
how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can pre-
clude our consideration of a federal question is itself a federal
question.166
Citing prior decisions rejecting absolute adherence to the principle of lim-
itation on jurisdiction due to application of state procedural default
rules,167 the Henry Court concluded:
These cases settle the proposition that a litigant's procedural defaults
in state proceedings do not prevent vindication of his federal rights un-
less the State's insistence on compliance with its procedural rule serves a
legitimate state interest. In every case we must inquire whether the
enforcement of a procedural forfeiture serves such a state interest.
If it does not, the state procedural rule ought not be permitted to
bar vindication of important federal rights.168
The determination that procedural default in the state process will no
longer bar federal review of claims of racial discrimination in the admin-
istration of the death penalty is one that the Court could make, consistent
with Henry. Such a change in approach would enhance existing protec-
164. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
165. Id. at 447.
166. Id.
167. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) ("Whether [the federal issue] was
so presented and was decided is itself a federal question."); Love v. Griffith, 266
U.S. 32, 33 (1924) ("When as here there is a plain assertion of federal rights in the
lower court, local rules as to how far it shall be reviewed on appeal do not necessa-
rily prevail.").
168. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965) (emphasis added).
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tions against constitutionally-defective capital sentences, furthering the
important public policy of eliminating the pernicious influence of racial
prejudice from the criminal justice system.
There is one other point that bears on this proposed course of action.
When a state court finds that a federal constitutional claim has been de-
faulted, it makes that determination as a matter of choice. A state court
could always decide that enforcement of the federal constitutional protec-
tion implicated by the claim warrants review despite the default. Once
the state court elects to review an otherwise defaulted federal constitu-
tional claim on the merits, declining to hold it defaulted, the decision per-
mits federal review if, in fact, the state court has rejected relief on the
merits.169 In fact, the recognition of doctrines of fundamental70 and plain
error171 in most jurisdictions demonstrates that procedural default of sig-
nificant claims is often excused so that a reviewing court may prevent
injustice by resolving an unpreserved claim on the merits.172
This does not mean that procedural default rules should never apply
to excuse failure to seek recourse in state court for the constitutional claim
of racial discrimination in the imposition of a death sentence. A deliber-
ate decision by a litigant-and not necessarily a deliberate decision on the
part of counsel made without the capital defendant's intelligent agree-
ment-to disregard state process in favor of presenting the claim in fed-
eral proceedings would warrant dismissal of the claim upon a proper
showing of intent. Thus, the "deliberate bypass" doctrine of Fay v.
Noia,173 operating to bar federal review of a claim not presented to state
169. For instance, in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Court reversed based
on the prosecutor's final argument in a capital case which advised the jury that any
error in its exercise of sentencing discretion would be corrected on appeal, an argu-
ment designed to diminish the jury's appreciation of its responsibility in setting
punishment at death. The error had been preserved by objection at trial, but not
urged on appeal. Although the state supreme court could have simply not ad-
dressed the issue, it found that the improper argument did not warrant relief. Cald-
well, 472 U.S. at 326-27. The Court's decision on the merits of the federal
constitutional claim afforded the United States Supreme Court the option of review-
ing the claim on certiorari, leading to the reversal in the case. See also Harris v.
Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (holding that state court ruling not resting on plain state-
ment of state law grounds as basis for decision does not deprive federal habeas
court of jurisdiction to review claim of federal constitutional error).
170. E.g., Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that fundamen-
tal error of constitutional dimension requires no objection); State v. Ramirez, 648
P.2d 307-08 (N.M. 1982) (noting improper comment on accused's decision to remain
silent constitutes fundamental error, reviewable even in the absence of a contempo-
raneous trial objection).
171. E.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (explicating federal plain error rule);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be consid-
ered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.").
172. E.g., State v. Barber, 92 P.3d 633, 636-40 (N.M. 2004). In describing the type of error
deemed "fundamental" under New Mexico law, the court noted that the error:
... must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right
which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit
him to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own
merits. Out of the facts in each case will arise the law.
Id. at 635 (citing State v. Garcia, 128 P.2d 459, 462 (N.M. 1942)).
173. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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courts only when the petitioner deliberately sought to avoid review in the
state courts, would be resurrected to apply in the limited circumstance of
requiring capital defendants to attempt to present their claims in state
proceedings, even when futile because of procedural non-compliance.174
The Court severely limited Fay in Wainwright v. Sykes, where the Court
held that procedural default of a federal constitutional claim in the state
courts could only be excused if the federal petitioner could demonstrate
both "cause" and "prejudice" warranting the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion.175 The Court's decision in Coleman v. Thompson176 finally repudiated
the Fay "deliberate bypass" approach to excusing state procedural de-
faults. The resurrection of "deliberate bypass" in the instant context,
however, does not affirmatively permit federal habeas petitioners to by-
pass state litigation in order to pursue their claims in federal courts.
Rather, reliance on this standard would limit the expanded authority for
federal review of claims based on racial discrimination in capital prosecu-
tions. In this sense, the proposal does not implicitly overrule the Court's
position that has evolved from Fay v. Noia to Wainwright v. Sykes to Cole-
man v. Thompson, but provides a stopgap where a claim of racial discrimi-
nation has not been subjected to resolution in state courts as a matter of
deliberate strategy on the part of petitioner and counsel.
The federal habeas statute clearly contemplates that state inmates will
present their federal constitutional claims to state courts'77 when state
process affords them a potential remedy to redress constitutional viola-
tions.178 Section 2254(b), however, also includes an alternative to the gen-
eral requirement for exhaustion of state remedies, providing that the
federal habeas court has jurisdiction when claims have previously been
exhausted in state proceedings or when either "(i) there is an absence of
available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant."179
The possibility that a state court would not apply a recognized rule of
procedural default to bar consideration of the claim on the merits sug-
gests that the petitioner must attempt exhaustion even when it would
appear futile based on any prior disposition on the merits in another state
174. Id. at 399.
175. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1972) (noting: "[w]e leave open for resolu-
tion in future decisions the precise definition of the 'cause'-and-'prejudice' stan-
dard" while observing that the test is narrower than that recognized in Fay).
176. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991).
177. E.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (recognizing "simple and clear instruc-
tion to potential litigants" to take their claims first to state courts).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2010) provides: "(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted unless it appears that-(A) the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State .... " Id. Moreover, subsection (c)
mandates that the petitioner first exhaust any available remedy before proceeding
in the federal habeas process: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section,
if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2010) (emphasis added).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B) (2010).
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proceeding.180 Exhaustion may be excused where it would prove futile,181
and the federal habeas court may agree with a petitioner's argument that
dismissal or abatement of the pending federal litigation should not be
required to permit further litigation in state courts. But the requirement
for exhaustion, unless expressly waived by the State,182 will typically re-
quire that a state defendant litigate his federal constitutional claims in
available state court proceedings before proceeding in federal court.1 83
The problem arises when late discovery of the claim may bar timely filing
of a state post-conviction petition, even though the inmate may have time
remaining to file his federal habeas claim.
A cautious petitioner faced with the alternative of pursuing a previ-
ously unlitigated claim in a state proceeding might proceed with federal
litigation and address the exhaustion problem only if the State moves to
dismiss to require exhaustion of any remaining state remedy. Because
federal habeas claims for state inmates must be brought within a year
following the conclusion of the state court direct appeal,184 including the
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,185 state post-
conviction litigation would ordinarily be expected not to conclude within
the one year limitations period. The federal statutory limitations period is
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2010).
181. For instance, in Eaton v. Wyrick, 528 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1975), the circuit court recog-
nized that exhaustion is not deemed futile absent a clear manifestation that a state
court will reject a petitioner's constitutional claims. In that pre-AEDPA case, the
court explained the "futility" exception to the exhaustion requirement:
This exception derives from a recognition that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) are
based on a principle of comity rather than a technical jurisdictional limitation.
While due regard for that principle requires that the state be afforded the initial
opportunity to consider alleged violations of the federal constitutional rights of
its prisoners, a petitioner is not required to file repetitious or futile applications
in the state courts.
Eaton, 528 F.2d at 482.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2010) provides: "A State shall not be deemed to have waived
the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement un-
less the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement." Id.
183. An example of the Court's commitment to exhaustion as a key prerequisite to the
exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction is demonstrated in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838 (1999), where the issue involved the petitioner's failure to seek review in
the state supreme court of an adverse determination by the intermediate appellate
court on a federal constitutional claim. The failure to seek review in the Illinois
Supreme Court from an adverse ruling in the intermediate court resulted in a fail-
ure to exhaust the claim, even though the Illinois Supreme Court discouraged fil-
ings that would require affirmance based on the application of precedent. Id. at
839-40.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides, in pertinent part:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of- (A) the date on which the
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review....
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2010).
185. The direct appeal ends for this purpose with the disposition of the petition for certi-
orari by the United States Supreme Court seeking review after conclusion of the
state appellate process following conviction. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321
n.6 (1987).
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tolled during the pendency of any properly-filed petition for state post-
conviction relief.186 This would seemingly suggest that any attempt to ex-
haust state remedies would toll the federal habeas limitations period, but
that exception is subject to interpretation as to what constitutes a "prop-
erly filed" state application. In a series of decisions, the Court has consid-
ered what constitutes a "properly filed" application for state post-
conviction relief,187 and the danger for the unwary petitioner seeking to
comply with the statutory exhaustion requirement is that a state court
filing will be rejected on procedural grounds, potentially resulting in the
tolling provision being deemed inapplicable by the federal habeas court.
Similarly, the federal limitations period is also tolled for newly-dis-
covered constitutional claims, running from "the date on which the fac-
tual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence."188 To the extent that
claims of racial discrimination may prove to be among the most difficult
to discover, even when exercising exceptional diligence, because of the
likelihood of concealment on the part of state actors, this exception in the
federal statute would be of critical importance in such a case.
The best option for avoiding limitations problems likely lies in timely
filing in federal court, when possible, and seeking abatement of the fed-
eral proceeding, rather than dismissal, for purposes of exhaustion. In
Rhines v. Weber,189 the Court recognized that dismissal of a pending fed-
eral habeas petition for purposes of exhaustion may necessarily result in a
subsequent re-filing, after exhaustion of state remedies has been com-
pleted, requiring dismissal under the statute's one-petition rule.90 Rhines
does require that the petitioner show "good cause" for not previously
exhausting state process;191 of particular concern for the Court was that
abeyance of federal habeas proceedings challenging state court disposi-
tions in capital cases not be used to facilitate delay in execution of the
sentence. 92
Mindful of the Court's concerns in Rhines, capital petitioners asserting
newly-discovered claims of racial discrimination tainting the proceedings
186. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2010) ("The time during which a properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.").
187. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 5-8, (2000) (noting petition "properly filed" when
delivered and accepted by "appropriate court officer for placement into the official
record"); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002) (tolling of federal filing period
dependent on state court finding that petition was timely filed); Pace v. DiGug-
lielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (stating that untimely filing in state court bars reliance on
tolling provision of federal habeas statute). But see Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct.
681 (2009) (permitting defendant to file out-of-time appeal, federal statute tolled
pending disposition of state court proceedings).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2009).
189. 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) provides: "A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior applica-
tion shall be dismissed." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2009).
191. 544 U.S. at 277.
192. Id. at 278.
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in state court should present as fully a developed claim as possible in the
federal proceeding. The Court's adoption of the structural error standard
would serve to promote the goal of addressing such claims on the merits
by virtually ensuring that capital litigants who have made appropriate
effort to discover and present their racial prejudice claims will meet its
standard for good cause in order to permit fair consideration of those
claims. This may, of course, involve abeyance to afford the petitioner a
reasonable opportunity to present his claim in available state process, or
result in a finding that state process is not available for litigation of the
claim, permitting the federal habeas court to proceed to consider the
claim on the merits without exhaustion in the state courts.
This approach to the problems posed by the statutory exhaustion re-
quirement and the Court's recognition of procedural default as a bar to
litigation of many newly-discovered constitutional claims would further
the Court's expressed goal of eliminating racism from the administration
of the death penalty. But it is not designed to simply ignore conventional
process, only to permit litigation of claims that without doubt undermine
the integrity of death sentences and, consequently, the criminal justice
system. Defendants should continue to be under a duty to exercise due
diligence in attempting to raise claims of racial discrimination once dis-
closed or discovered, even though such claims might be subject to proce-
dural default in state proceedings. State courts, however, would be able
to avoid federal habeas review of defaulted claims by electing not to im-
pose default rules and addressing the claims on the merits.
Finally, the Supreme Court should speak definitively with respect to
procedural default of racial discrimination claims in the state courts in
order to give federal habeas courts the unequivocal authority to address
constitutional claims based on racial discrimination in state prosecutions.
Because the authority of federal habeas courts to order relief for state in-
mates must be predicated on a showing that the state court disposition is
contrary to or reflects an unreasonable application of existing Supreme
Court precedent,193 a state court's disposition resting on procedural de-
fault would typically not appear to trigger federal habeas jurisdiction.194
However, if the Court were to hold that such claims could not be proce-
durally defaulted in capital cases unless deliberately withheld, the Court's
pronouncement would open the door to litigation of such claims on their
merits in the federal habeas process.
c. Supplanting deferential review with de novo review of claims of racial
discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
Much as the requirement for deference to state court application of
state procedural rules serves to frustrate litigation of meritorious claims,
requiring deference to the process and results of state court decision-mak-
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2010); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).
194. The exception to the usual rule of deference to state court application of procedural
default rules lies when the federal court finds that the state procedural default rule
has not been consistently applied, or when the state court engages in an "exorbitant
application" of a "generally sound rule," of procedural default. Lee v. Kemna, 542
U.S. 362, 376 (2002).
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ing can also mask constitutional violations that should require relief
under the federal habeas statute. The federal habeas statute has long re-
quired deference to state court fact-finding,195 but the statute also afforded
the habeas court discretion to order an evidentiary hearing in the event
the petitioner could demonstrate that he had been deprived of a full and
fair opportunity to develop his factual predicate for a federal claim in the
state courts based on one or more of the statutory exceptions included in
subsection (d) of then-Section 2254.196 Otherwise, state court factual de-
terminations were entitled to a presumption of correctness binding upon
federal habeas courts.197
The Supreme Court's decision in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes98 further re-
stricted federal habeas court fact-finding by imposing on the petitioner a
much higher duty to develop the factual predicate for his constitutional
claims in state proceedings. Prior to the Court's restrictive decision in
Tamayo-Reyes, federal courts had operated with greater discretion to af-
ford federal habeas petitioners expanded opportunities to develop the ev-
195. Marshall v. Lonberger, 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1983). Prior to adoption of the 1996
amendments to the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provided:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,
a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the
writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia,
shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-(1) that the merits of the fac-
tual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing; (2) that the fact[-
]finding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (3) that the material facts were not adequately developed
at the State court hearing; (4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding; (5)
that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding; (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hear-
ing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied
due process of law in the State court proceeding; (8) or unless that part of the
record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual
issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter,
and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole
concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one
or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1)
to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by
the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, consid-
ered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden
shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the fac-
tual determination by the State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2010).
196. Id.
197. E.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551 (1981) (holding that facts found by state
appellate courts, as well as state trial courts, are binding on federal habeas courts).
198. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
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identiary record if necessary to support a colorable claim for habeas
relief.199 This approach effectively prevented federal habeas petitioners
from bypassing the state courts for purpose of litigation of factual matters
essential to resolution of the federal claims.
In combination with the requirement for deference to state court fact
determinations as controlling on federal habeas courts, the Court's deci-
sion in Tamayo-Reyes served to require state court defendants to fully pre-
sent their federal constitutional claims to the state courts for initial
resolution. The Court did recognize an exception in situations in which a
habeas petitioner exercised due diligence in attempting to develop the
factual basis for the federal constitutional claim, but was effectively pre-
vented from doing so by state authorities or the operation of state proce-
dural rules limiting his ability to do so. 200 Later, in reviewing the
deference required by the AEDPA amendment to the federal habeas stat-
ute in Williams v. Taylor,21 the Court essentially validated Tamayo-Reyes in
finding that subsection 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) and (B) reflected the approach
taken there.202 The combined effect of the Court's restriction on federal
court fact-finding in Tamayo-Reyes and the approach taken by Congress in
AEDPA is to limit fact-finding in the federal habeas courts to those situa-
tions in which the petitioner can demonstrate that additional fact-finding
is warranted based on his actual innocence of the offense.
At least superficially, the operation of Tamayo-Reyes and subsection
(e)(2) would appear to foreclose consideration of most discrimination-
based claims because either they would not demonstrate actual innocence
or the supporting evidentiary basis for the claims would not have been
developed in state proceedings. The problem is that often discovery of
the evidence of racial discrimination was simply not timely in terms of
state court process, almost certainly due to the inherent difficulties in dis-
cerning an unconstitutional intent deliberately or habitually concealed by
the actors involved. Sterling's trial counsel made this very point in re-
sponding to the ineffective assistance claim based on his failure to voir
dire prospective jurors on attitudes on race when he explained that jurors
are not candid with respect to these kinds of inquiries. This reflects the
common problem of racism that once was acceptable in the community
199. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316-17 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
504 U.S. at 5.
200. Id. at 8, 12.
201. 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
202. Id. at 433-34. The applicable statutory section, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), now provides:
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State
court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim
unless the applicant shows that-
(A) the claim relies on-
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral re-
view by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through
the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2010).
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essentially going "underground'"-being concealed, rather than being
addressed through changed disposition.
The statute does provide an alternative theory for presentation of
these newly discovered claims and development of supporting records,
assuming that the courts vigorously interpret subsection (b) to afford re-
lief where potentially meritorious challenges are made.203 It permits con-
sideration of a constitutional claim not previously litigated in the state
courts such that state remedies have been fully exhausted where no state
remedy exists for consideration of the claim,204 or where "circumstances
exist" rendering unexhausted state process "ineffective to protect the
rights" of the habeas petitioner.205
Despite the generally draconian tone of the 1996 amendments to fed-
eral habeas process adopted in the AEDPA, Congress appears to have
deliberately left the door open to litigation of newly-discovered claims of
precisely the type envisioned in this article. Arguably, these provisions,
particularly in recognizing in subsection (b) that state process for the
presentation and development of the claim may be unavailable or inade-
quate in certain instances, will permit newly discovered claims of racial
discrimination on the part of any actor 206 in the state capital litigation pro-
cess to proceed on their merits in federal habeas proceedings.
The procedural limitations upon development of the factual predicate
necessary to support a federal constitutional claim may not be the only or
most burdensome obstacles to federal habeas relief. Instead, perhaps the
most important obstacle in many cases is the tendency of federal judges
to defer to state court decisions as a matter of comity or judicial courtesy,
203. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B) (2010). This section provides:
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that-(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the applicant.
Id.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) (2010).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2010).
206. In Sterling's situation, of course, the "state action" or "state actor" requirement
would necessarily have to be satisfied by the conduct of jurors who might not other-
wise be regarded as "state actors." See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company,
500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (describing the jury as "an entity that is a quintessential
governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor" in performing govern-
mental function). Because the promise of a fair jury trial, implicit in the Sixth
Amendment guarantee, and an unbiased jury, implicit in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees of due process and equal protection, necessarily embraces fair dis-
closures by a prospective juror in voir dire and deliberations, jurors essentially
function as state actors in the criminal prosecution process. See, e.g., Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000) (involving a jury foreperson who failed to disclose
seventeen-year marriage to detective who was prosecution's lead detective at trial);
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950) (preserving right to prove actual
bias on part of trial jury); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119-20 (1983) (admonishing
trial judges to disclose instances of potential irregularity involving jurors during the
course of trial to permit remedy); FED. R. EVID. 606(b) ("[A] juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror.").
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which compromises many claims that would otherwise merit federal
habeas relief. This tendency has been reinforced by Supreme Court deci-
sions in which the good faith of state judges has been accepted, appar-
ently with little question,207 and by cases in which federal judges appear
reluctant to even evaluate state court decisions on the basis of reason,
apparently fearing charges that in doing so they merely substitute their
subjective assessments for those of state judges.
While the requirement for deference to state court findings of fact and
law is mandated by the re-structured federal habeas statute,208 two differ-
ent factors serve to compromise the ability of federal habeas courts to
protect capital defendants from racially-tainted death sentences. First,
while federal courts are required to defer to findings of state courts in
reviewing claims of violations of federal constitutional rights, state courts
themselves are not bound to defer to unreasonable explanations for con-
duct by state actors or defense attorneys that mask racial discrimination
or stereotyping. Realistically, however, decisions of state trial judges who
preside over both trials and, typically, post-conviction proceedings are
likely to be influenced by their very personal proximity to those actors in
the system that they are obligated to supervise.209 State trial judges, par-
ticularly elected judges, function in the community in which prosecutors,
defense counsel, police, and jurors are most likely to live and work. Par-
ticularly in the case of capital defendants charged with commission of the
most egregious offenses, state trial judges must be expected to share more
in common with virtually everyone else in the prosecution process than
with the criminal defendants themselves. If subject to popular rejection
by election, the added pressure of the publicity of the heinous crimes
prosecuted in their courts with its potential to shape public opinion re-
quires even greater resolve on the part of judges to rule dispassionately
and aggressively in protecting the constitutional rights of capital
defendants.
Moreover, even assuming that state trial judges act most diligently,
state post-conviction process routing constitutional claims through the
state court of conviction may also create anxiety for a trial judge in whose
court a death sentence has been imposed in retrospectively considering
whether the sentence has been influenced by constitutional error. Where
the sentence has been imposed by a jury, the state judge must consider
invalidating the conviction or sentence based on claims that may well im-
207. See e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985). In explaining that issues relating to the
voluntariness of a confession are subject to de novo review, the Court noted: "We
reiterate our confidence that state judges, no less than their federal counterparts,
will properly discharge their duty to protect the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants." Id.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2010).
209. State post-conviction processes commonly require the petitioning convicted defen-
dant to file the application in the trial court of conviction. E.g., ARK. R. CRM. PRO.
37.5 (authorizing post-conviction attack on capital convictions resulting in imposi-
tion of the death penalty); NMRA 5-802D(1) (authorizing filing petition for post-
conviction relief in New Mexico district court of conviction); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071, sec. 4(a) (authorizing filing of application for post-conviction relief
in case in which death sentence imposed in court of conviction).
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pugn the integrity of the process, particularly where the claim rests on an
allegation that racial prejudice has infected the process. Prosecutors, de-
fense counsel and police necessarily understand and accept the legal re-
quirements for due process, but lay jurors may not understand attacks on
a verdict or sentence rendered that is perceived to fairly reflect the evi-
dence. The suggestion that racial animus has influenced a jury verdict
likely carries the greatest potential for adverse public reaction to a deter-
mination that the verdict must be set aside.
The second flaw in the process of reviewing constitutional challenges
lies in the tension between the statutory requirement for deference, gener-
ally, and the appreciation for the role of reasonableness in assessing state
court findings. The Court's decisions in Miller-El and Snyder both demon-
strate the ongoing problem of undue deference afforded state trial judges
in considering claims attacking the use of peremptory challenges by state
prosecutors. 210 Because trial court decisions have been accorded defer-
ence based on the immediate opportunity for trial judges to assess credi-
bility of prospective jurors and prosecutors, deference to their decisions
has generally been accepted as reasonable.211 Yet, in both Miller-El and
Snyder the Court was forced to concede, at least by implication based on
the fact that it reviewed the same record in each case on two different
occasions, that lower courts simply had not considered trial court conclu-
sions concerning the motivation of prosecutors in exercising peremptory
challenges against black venirepersons with a reasoned skepticism. The
lower courts had afforded deference more as an exercise of comity and in
line with conventional wisdom about the superiority of trial court fact-
finding than as a result of reasoned consideration of the record.
But perhaps an even better indicator of the Court's view of the role of
state courts in terms of the enforcement of federal constitutional protec-
tions is evident in its treatment of the habeas process in Brecht v. Abraham-
son212 and Fry v. Pliler.213 When a state court reviews a federal
constitutional claim on direct appeal, it must apply the harmlessness stan-
dard of Chapman v. California.214 Under Chapman, the burden is placed on
the prosecution to demonstrate that constitutional trial error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt in order to avoid reversal.25 In Brecht,
however, the Court held that when that same error is recognized by the
federal habeas court, the petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he can
also establish by a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the course
of the proceedings.26 When the federal habeas court is in "grave doubt"
as to whether the prejudice standard has been met, the petitioner is enti-
tled to relief.217
210. See supra notes 44-69, and accompanying text.
211. E.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (holding state court's finding regarding
qualification of prospective juror to serve on capital jury presumed correct in fed-
eral habeas court).
212. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
213. 127 S.Ct. 2321 (2007).
214. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
215. Id. at 324.
216. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631.
217. O'Neal v. McAinich, 513 U.S. 432 (1995).
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The Brecht Court rejected the argument that the more difficult burden
of obtaining relief on federal constitutional claims in the habeas process
might lead some state courts to simply fail to apply Chapman rigor-
ously.218 But in fact, the application of the Brecht standard in numerous
cases demonstrates that whether intentional or not, state courts failed to
vigorously enforce constitutional protections. The Eighth Circuit alone
had taken the position that if state courts have failed to recognized fed-
eral constitutional claims and apply the Chapman standard in their re-
view, the Chapman harmlessness test should be applied when the same
claims are advanced in the federal habeas process.219 However, the Court
rejected this approach in a case arising from the Ninth Circuit, Fry v.
Pliler,220 holding that the Brecht prejudice standard applies in all federal
habeas proceedings,221 effectively insulating state court refusal or reluc-
tance to enforce federal constitutional guarantees aggressively from cor-
rection through the federal habeas process.
The federal habeas statute's required deference to state fact-finding is
not absolute, of course, but the significant limitation imposed on federal
habeas courts based on the defendant's failure to develop an adequate
record in state proceedings addressed by subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)
may compromise many otherwise meritorious claims. In many cases, of
course, a state procedural default may bar development of the necessary
record, such as where the habeas petitioner has failed to comply with a
requirement that all claims be presented in the state court in a single pro-
ceeding. For the federal habeas petitioner, this is particularly troubling
when the facts supporting the claim were not discovered until after the
filing or litigation of the initial petition for relief.222
The key to the elimination of racial discrimination in the administra-
tion of the death penalty lies in the Supreme Court's recognition of the
difficulties created by its own decisions dealing with the enforcement of
federal constitutional rights. Deference to the decisions made by lower
courts, whether state courts or lower federal courts, cannot further the
goal of elimination of racial discrimination if the attitudes of judges
218. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636. Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed this argument:
Petitioner argues that application of the Chapman harmless-error standard on
collateral review is necessary to deter state courts from relaxing their own
guard in reviewing constitutional error and to discourage prosecutors from
committing error in the first place. Absent affirmative evidence that state-court
judges are ignoring their oath, we discount petitioner's argument that courts
will respond to our ruling by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the
Constitution.
Id. at 636. Of course, if Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct, there would have been
little need for legislation creating the federal habeas remedy for state court
defendants.
219. Orndorff v. Lockhart. 998 F.2d 1426, 1429-30 (8th Cir. 1993).
220. 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2338 (2007).
221. Id.
222. In Osborne, for instance, this subsection would not afford any option for relief be-
cause the claim of racism on counsel's part did not relate to a claim of actual inno-
cence. Instead, it addressed a claim rejected on the merits of the initial petition by
the state court that counsel failed to inform Osborne of the plea offer made by the
prosecution that would have permitted Osborne to avoid the possibility of a death
sentence following conviction at trial.
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charged with the duty to enforce the Constitution are insensitive to the
problem or too ready to deny the possibility of existence of racial discrim-
ination in their courts. The Court's hesitance in addressing the realities of
judicial decision-making over the years has led to the current situation in
which superficial adherence to constitutional values is accompanied by
indifference, perhaps even willful indifference.
The Court's only tools for reversing the drift toward accommodation
of racial bias, most often latent and not patent, are its ability to reverse
lower court decisions in the certiorari and federal habeas processes and in
asserting its positions in the strongest possible language in decisions ren-
dered on constitutional questions. The final decisions in Snyder and
Miller-El demonstrate its use of the power of reversal when state and
lower federal courts fail to respond to initial implied directives in vacat-
ing and remanding for reconsideration. Once lower courts fail to appreci-
ate the Court's concern in ordering a second consideration, their
intransigence must be dealt with by rendition on further review by a sub-
sequent grant of certiorari.
Not all reconsiderations, of course, reflect intransigence on the part of
lower courts. Indeed, no doubt in the majority of cases, the lower court
performs a necessary part of the process of applying legal principle to the
pertinent facts in the record properly. But where matters of racial dis-
crimination are at issue, and particularly when they implicate a misuse of
the death penalty based upon discriminatory intent or indifference to
constitutional protections, the Court should act far more aggressively in
forcing recognition of the problem posed and demand that lower courts
themselves act aggressively in ordering relief. Formal recognition that
factually-supported claims of racial discrimination in the administration
of the death penalty constitute matters of fundamental, structural error
would remove much of the uncertainty in enforcement of existing
remedies.
The additional problem, however, is not a matter of precision in ex-
isting rules or principles, but instead rests in the subjective evaluations
made by lower court judges when issues of racial discrimination are
raised and supported by credible evidence, particularly when the evi-
dence is controverted. To ensure that capital sentences are not influenced
by racial animus or deliberate discrimination, the Court must also set a
new tone for dealing with these issues. Snyder demonstrates the point:
although the Court eventually corrected the constitutional error in the im-
proper exclusion of a minority juror from the capital trial, it did so with
an almost apologetic tone, continuing to emphasize the usual virtue of
deference to trial court observation and evaluation in the process of con-
sidering the claim of discrimination.
Rather than adopting the cautious tone of Snyder in addressing cases
in which racial discrimination claims provide the focus for the Court's
review, it should address the issues far more aggressively in order to
clearly indicate to lower courts its expectation that such claims will be
viewed with the highest level of scrutiny. In order to prevent the use of
capital punishment to further constitutionally impermissible values such
as racial oppression-even when the effect is clearly collateral and not a
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deliberate aspect of public policy-the Court has to give more substance
to its traditional and consistent expressions of racial fairness in the ad-
ministration of the death penalty. This also means that the Court must
expand its docket, if necessary, and use the certiorari process affirma-
tively to address claims that are rooted in racial discrimination so that
cases like Sterling and Osborne do not fall through the cracks in litigation
and appellate review created by unreasonable deference and inflexible
policies of procedural default.
C. Consequences, intended and unintended, of adoption of the proposed
reform
The combination of reforms proposed here to deal with racially-
tainted death sentences would undoubtedly prompt criticism based on a
number of observations. With regard to each, the only justification for
overruling or limiting the Court's precedent in order to facilitate federal
review of capital sentences must lie in the constitutional promise that the
criminal justice system will operate fairly and without the influence of
racial animus or discrimination that compromises equality before the law.
Thus, critics might complain that this proposal will necessarily in-
crease the amount of litigation designed to attack death sentences. The
reality is that the 6apital sentencing and review systems are already de-
signed to afford maximum litigation opportunities for state and federal
death row inmates opting to challenge their convictions and sentences,
particularly in habeas corpus actions brought in federal court. 223
Second, critics might argue that recognition of claims of racial discrim-
ination as matters of "structural error" and restricted reliance on defer-
ence to state dispositions resting on procedural default and state court
fact and law finding are all too likely to result in a dramatic increase in
grant of federal habeas relief. This could, of course, cause some practical
difficulty for state courts and prosecutors forced to retry capital cases or
proceed with re-sentencing proceedings, as well as resulting in dramatic
increases in the cost of obtaining a death sentence. But the fact is, such a
dramatic result would only occur if substantial numbers of capital
sentences required relief because of the presence of racial animus or dis-
crimination on the part of jurors or state actors in the capital prosecution
or litigation processes.
223. Federal law provides for appointment of counsel to represent state court defendants
in federal habeas actions, 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2010), and also provides for ap-
pointment of counsel qualified for capital representation. Subsection (e) provides
for representation throughout the course of all proceedings. Section 3599(f) autho-
rizes compensation for investigative expenses and expert witness fees and subsec-
tions (g)(1) and (2) authorize payment of reasonable compensation for counsel and
supporting services. The federal statute recognizes a right to counsel for state
death-sentenced inmates independent of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). As part of a
statutory package for expediting capital litigation, states are also required to pro-
vide similar access to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings in capital pro-
ceedings in order to qualify for expedited federal review of death sentences,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2010).
LETHAL DISCRIMINATION 2: REPAIRING THE REMEDIES E 161
Balanced against the obvious costs and problems associated with any
argued increase in cases in which federal habeas relief would be appro-
priate is the reality that this result would demonstrate exactly how flawed
capital sentencing now is in terms of protection against racial discrimina-
tion in the administration of the death penalty.
CONCLUSION
The proposal advanced here for reforming and enhancing remedies in
place to address racial discrimination in the administration of capital
punishment is ambitious and would certainly require the United States
Supreme Court to retreat somewhat from its recent moves towards tradi-
tional notions of federalism. Nevertheless, the Court surely recognizes
the difficulty created by its insistence on insulating capital punishment
from attacks based on issues arising from persistent problems of racial
and ethnic prejudice implicit in McCleskey v. Kemp. And the 7-2 split in
Snyder v. Louisiana surely indicates that a majority of the Justices realize
that intransigence on the part of state courts, coupled with the lengthy
proceedings in Miller-El reflecting abdication of federal courts to state
court decision-making, unequivocally demonstrate that the Court's com-
mitment to enforcing the guarantee of discrimination-free capital sentenc-
ing is compromised by the general application of its precedents to ignore,
avoid, or rationalize instances of racial discrimination in individual capi-
tal trials.
If the Court can simply unburden itself of an unrealistic expectation
that state courts and lower federal courts will properly enforce constitu-
tional values when confronted by serious and credible claims of discrimi-
nation raised in the context of prosecutions involving the most heinous
crimes, then it can restructure the process for review of those claims. In
that process, the message to state courts and lower federal courts will be
one that makes clear that racial discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty cannot be tolerated or excused. Otherwise, the credibility
of the most potent deterrent in the punishment arsenal will be inherently
compromised.
Of course, swift and complete reform could be achieved legislatively.
However, the two main achievements of Congress in recent years have
been the restriction of federal habeas relief through the passage of
AEDPA224 in 1996, which expanded the requirement for deference to state
court determinations in the federal habeas process, 225 and the creation of
an expedited review process to speed capital cases through post-trial re-
view in state and federal courts to execution.226
The impact of racial prejudice on the integrity of the criminal justice
system cannot be ignored. As the Court observed in Rose v. Mitchell:
"Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially
224. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 104 P.L. 132 (1996).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), (e) (2010).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2261, et seq. The statutory scheme provides for expedited review of
federal habeas actions in which a sentence of death imposed by a state court is
challenged on federal constitutional grounds where state process complies with
Congressionally-dictated standards for procedural due process.
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pernicious in the administration of justice."227 Ultimately, the duty to en-
force constitutional protections rests with the judicial branch. It is the
Supreme Court that must confront the failure of its jurisprudence to pre-
vent racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty.
227. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979).
